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Leonard: AIDS and Employment Law Revisited

AIDS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW REVISITED
Arthur S. Leonard*
If 1983 was the year AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) became a household word in the United States,1 1985 was
the year the ramifications of AIDS hit the workplaces of America
with full force. Although this medical condition was first identified
as a distinct disease entity in 1981,2 and about seven thousand cases
had been counted by the United States Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) by the end of 1984,1 it was during 1985 that a new blood test
for antibodies to the virus suspected of causing AIDS became generally available.4 It was also during 1985 that the number of cases and
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.S., Cornell University (Industrial and Labor Relations), 1974; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977. The writer acknowledges
the research assistance of Ronald Gottlieb, New York Law School Class of 1987, and invaluable assistance in assembling pertinent case materials from Abby Rubenfeld, Esq., Legal Director of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Leonard Graff, Esq., Legal Director of
National Gay Rights Advocates, Benjamin Schatz, Esq., Director of AIDS Project, National
Gay Rights Advocates, and Karen Walker, Bureau of National Affairs. Despite the cover date
of this issue, this Article is current as of September 1986.
1. D. ALTMAN, AIDS IN THE MIND OF AMERICA 4 (1986). This book provides an excellent history of the AIDS epidemic and its social impact in a variety of settings. It is necessary
reading for anyone interested in the politics surrounding research and provision of services. An
excellent summary of much of the same material can be found in Lieberson, The Reality of
AIDS, N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 16, 1986, at 43-48. For a comprehensive medical review of the
first five years of the epidemic, see AIDS FROM THE BEGINNING (H. Cole and G. Lundberg
eds. 1986) (published by the A.M.A.), and AIDS: PAPERS FROM SCIENCE, 1982-1985 (R.
Kulstad ed. 1986) (reprinting material originally appearing in Science, the journal of the
American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science) [hereinafter cited as PAPERS FROM
SCIENCE].

2. See Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Report of InterAgency Recommendations, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 101 (March 4,
1983); Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men-New
York City and California, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 305-308 (July 3,
1981); Pneumocystis Pneumonia-LosAngeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
250-252 (June 5, 1981). The Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report is a publication of the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC). See also Comment, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17
AKRON L. REv. 717, 718-22 (1984).
3. Leonard, Employment DiscriminationAgainst Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L
REv. 681, 681 n.2 (1985).
4. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 56-57.
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their dispersion throughout the country became so widespread 5 that
employment lawyers became concerned with the legal issues surrounding AIDS in the workplace.6 Greater public exposure and discussion intensified these workplace problems because the public apparently did not believe the statements by public health officials that
AIDS was not spread by casual contact.
The workplace problems took many different forms." Some em5. By May 12, 1986, the CDC had counted 20,531 cases nationwide, with more than 13
cases in more than 46 of the states, and some cases in virtually all the states. New York State
had about one-third of all the cases (6758). The growth of the epidemic can be shown from the
following figures: In 1979, there were I 1 cases which have been retrospectively confirmed by
CDC, 47 cases in 1980, and 260 in 1981, when the CDC definition of AIDS was adopted. In
1982, CDC counted 994 cases, 2719 in 1983, 5331 in 1984, and, as of mid-December, more
than 6200 in 1985. As of May 12, 1986, CDC attributed 11,163 deaths to AIDS, about 54%
of the reported cases. Cases of AIDS or African Swine Fever Virus?, New York Native, June
2, 1986, at 9. For a graphic representation of the growth of the epidemic and projected future
growth, see Curran & Morgan, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: The Beginning, The
Present, and The Future, in AIDS FROM THE BEGINNING, supra note 1, at xxi-xxvi.
6. See AIDS Should be Treated as Handicap, Boston Lawyers Say, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 239, at A-6 (Dec. 12, 1985); AIDS is Protected Under Handicap Statute, Management Lawyer Contends, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 228, at A-6 (Nov. 26, 1985); Employment Issues Dominate at New York AIDS Conference, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 213,
at A-4 (Nov. 4, 1985); 1986 LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES at 4; 1985 LFSBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES
at 54. That the AIDS phenomenon is not a short-term problem is indicated by predictions of
public health officials. The CDC estimates that there will be between 14,000 and 15,000 new
cases diagnosed in 1986. Boffey, AIDS in the Future: Experts Say Deaths Will Climb
Sharply, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, at Cl, col. 3. New York City public health officials
predict that the city will experience 2400 new cases in 1987, 2520 in 1988, and 2640 in 1989.
D. Sencer & V. Botnick, Report to the Mayor: New York City's Response to the AIDS Crisis
4 (Dec. 1985). The Public Health Service estimates that by the end of 1991 there will be
270,000 cases of AIDS and 179,000 deaths, 54,000 deaths in 1991 alone. It estimates that 9%
of those diagnosed as having AIDS in 1991, 7000 people, will bie heterosexuals. Pear, Tenfold
Increase in AIDS Death Toll is Expected by '91, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
7. See Current Topics in Law and Policy, Fear Itself. AIDS, Herpes and Public Health
Decisions, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 479, 517 n.215 (1985); Poll Indicates Majority Favor
Quarantine for AIDS Victims, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1985, at A24, col. 1.
8. See N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, AIDS Based Discrimination: A Summary of
Reported Instances September 1983-October 1985 (Nov. 8, 1985). While many accounts of
AIDS-based discrimination are purely anecdotal and undocumented, this report by the N.Y.
State Division of Human Rights is based on actual allegations brought to the attention of the
agency. Similar incidents are reported by the New York City Commission on Human Rights.
D. Sencer & V. Botnick, supra note 6, at 42-44. Other workplace incidents are described in
Skagen & Aberth, Responding to AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS THE WORKPLACE ISSUES
11, 12-13 (American Management Association (1985)); Stayer, Panic, Hysteria Overrule Reason in Workplace Response to AIDS, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 10, 1986, at 1, 43, and other
newspaper and magazine reports too numerous to cite specifically. In a letter to members of
the Lesbian and Gay Rights Subcommittee of the District of Columbia Bar, Jim Graham,
Administrator of the Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc., indicated that the Clinic had assisted persons with AIDS in obtaining legal help in 26 cases involving employment discrimination allegations. Letter from Jim Graham to the Lesbian and Gay Rights Subcommittee of the D.C.
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ployers seized upon the availability of the new blood test in an at-

tempt to remove seropositive9 individuals from their workforces, or to
avoid hiring them. 10 Some employers refused to hire members of
AIDS "risk groups." In other workplaces, employees or their unions
demanded that persons with AIDS be excluded, or they threatened
to refuse to work if people suspected of carrying the AIDS virus
were employed. 1 Upon a diagnosis of AIDS, some employees were
immediately suspended or discharged, or placed in isolated settings.1i Special pressures were experienced by employees in schools
and food handling activities as some legislators demanded enactment
of laws restricting seropositive individuals from working in such
3
jobs.1
Not surprisingly, the real world problems surrounding AIDS
rapidly became legal problems. The American workplace is heavily
Bar (Jan. 9, 1985) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).
9. Seropositive individuals are those who test positive on a series of laboratory tests
designed to confirm the presence in the blood of antibodies to a virus suspected of causing
AIDS. The cheapest, most commonly available test is the Enzyme Linked Immunoabsorbent
Assay (ELISA), a test that will almost always react positively to antibody presence as well as
other blood factors and conditions. Confirmation of a positive result is normally sought with an
additional test called a Western Blot, which is a more expensive, more difficult, and more
precise test for presence of the antibody. Bayer & Oppenheimer, AIDS in the Work Place:
The Ethical Ramifications, Bus. & HEALTH, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 30-31.
10. Id. at 31-33; Stayer, supra note 8, at 43.
1I. To be fair to the labor movement, some unions have taken an active role in opposing
AIDS-based discrimination and the use of antibody tests as a screening device for workers. See
Teachers With AIDS Barredfrom Work in Racine, Wis.; Lawsuit Threatened, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 225, at A-2 to A-3 (Nov. 21, 1985) (reporting that the Racine Education
Association, which represents 1800 of the school district's 2200 employees, is seeking an order
from the State Employee Relations Board directing the school district to bargain over its new
policy of barring teachers, staff, and students with AIDS from working in or attending school,
and is promising to file suit on behalf of any employee affected by the new policy); Racine
Educ. Ass'n v. Racine United School Dist., Equal Rights Div. Case No. 50279 (Wis. Dep't
Indus. Lab. Human Relations, Apr. 30, 1986) (available DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 98, at
E-I (May 21, 1986)); AFL-CIO Opposes AIDS Screening, Calls For More FederalFunding,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 213, at A-7 to A-8 (Nov. 4, 1985) (reporting adoption of a
resolution by the AFL-CIO at national convention opposing screening of workers for AIDS
unless such screening is recommended by the Centers for Disease Control); 1986 LESBIAN/
GAY LAW NOTES at 4 (reporting adoption by AFL-CIO Biennial Convention on Oct. 31, 1985
of resolution opposing use of HTLV-III antibody test to screen employees).
12. See, e.g., Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Mgm't Policy,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 242, at E-I (Dec. 17, 1985) (Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations
Dec. 11, 1985) (discharge of employee from his position because he had contracted AIDS held
unlawful).
13. Bayer & Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 31. See also 1985 LESBIAN/GAY LAW
NOTES at 41 (reporting on proposals pending in Florida and New Jersey to require food service
workers to be certified free of AIDS and other infectious diseases).
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regulated by federal, state, and local governments.14 Although the
common law rule governing the employment relationship is one
marked by a "freedom of coitract" ethos that leaves the parties to

settle the terms of their relationship and presumes terminability at
the will of either party for any or no reason, 5 a complex web of
employment regulation has grown up since the beginning of the
twentieth century. Thus, it is normal today for employers, especially
large corporate employers, to seek legal advice about any new workplace phenomenon. At the same time, employees who experience discrimination of any sort are likely to resort to legal remedies. 1"
This Article is a sequel to one written during 1984.17 In that
Article, I surveyed existing state and federal statutes restricting employment discrimination on the basis of physical handicap or disability, and tentatively concluded, in the absence of pertinent case law,
that AIDS would be considered a "handicap" or "disability" under
most of those laws."8 I concluded further that, given the epidemiology of the disease, employment discrimination against those who had
AIDS or other disorders stemming from infection with the virus suspected of causing AIDS would probably be held unlawful in most
jurisdictions.' 9 In the intervening year, some new legislation has been
passed, 20 and some cases have been decided 2 ' which tend to confirm
14. See Federal Labor Laws (West 7th ed. 1986), an 809-page compilation of federal
statutes regulating the workplace and employer-employee relations. A compilation of related
rules, guidelines and regulations promulgated by federal enforcement agencies would be much
longer. State and local regulation is also pervasive as indicated by a myriad of laws and regulations concerning wages and hours, health and safety, labor relations, child labor, fair employment practices, and the like.
15. See J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 11-16
(1983); Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsTORY 118 (1976).
16. This is evidenced by the mounting litigation over alleged "wrongful" dismissals, even
in those jurisdictions where neither statute nor common law precedent give any apparent cause
of action for such a suit. The New York City Commission on Human Rights has maintained
an AIDS discrimination unit since 1983. D. Sencer & V. Botnick, supra, note 6, at 42.
17. Leonard, supra note 3.
18. Id. at 689-93.
19. Id. at 693-703.
20. See infra note 52.
21. Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Racine United School Dist., iqual Rights Div. Case No.
50279 (Wis. Dep't Indus. Lab. Human Relations, Apr. 30, 1986) (available DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 98, at E-I (May 21, 1986)); Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985);
District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325
(Sup. Ct. 1986); Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Mgm't Policy, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 242, at E-1 (Dec. 17, 1985) (Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations Dec.
I1, 1985). Toward the end of June, 1986, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Depart-
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my earlier conclusions. In addition, other workplace issues surrounding AIDS have surfaced. The purpose of this Article is to bring the
employment discrimination law analysis up to date, to discuss some
new legal theories on AIDS-based employment discrimination, and
to explore other workplace legal issues raised by the AIDS
phenomenon.
In such a discussion, the peculiar common law treatment of the
American employment relationship is called into question.22 Indeed,
the AIDS phenomenon brings into sharp focus some of the significant problem areas of American employment law, the most prominent of which is the "terminable at will" concept, which some argue
is unsuited to a modern industrial society.2 s Also drawn into question
is the patchwork of regulatory statutes, which sometimes pull in opment issued a memorandum to the General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human
Services, expressing opinions as to the applicability of § 504 of Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794, to various types of AIDS-based discrimination. The memorandum, discussed in more detail infra, concluded in essence that the physical symptoms of AIDS and, probably, ARC, see
infra note 38 and accompanying text, should be considered a handicap, but that discrimination
against persons without physical symptoms or discrimination motivated by fear of contagion
would not violate the federal law. Cooper, Memo from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on
Application of Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 122, at D-I (June 25, 1986). See Pear, Rights Laws Offer Only Limited Help on
AIDS, U.S. Rules, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1986, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Pear, Rights
Laws]. Shortly after the Cooper memorandum appeared, however, the Office of Civil Rights,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, issued a finding of discrimination violative of
§ 504 in an AIDS case which appeared to give narrow effect to the Justice Department's
ruling. See In re Charlotte Memorial Hosp., No. 04-84-3096 (Region IV, Aug. 5, 1986); Pear,
U.S. Files First AIDS DiscriminationCharge,N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1986, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Pear, U.S. Files]. A federal district court in Florida overruled a motion to dismiss an AIDS discrimination claim by a public employee, which was based in the alternative
on § 504 and constitutional rights, in a decision rendered July 8, 1986, and has set the case for
trial. Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 406 (S.D. Fla. July
8, 1986) (county clerical employee discharged after AIDS diagnosis).
22. The American common law context is peculiar in that no other major western industrial nation provides so little in the way of job security to private sector employees. See Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal. Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV.
481, 508-19 (1976).
23. The proliferation of scholarly criticism of the continued application of the "terminable at will" rule is such that existence of such criticism hardly need be documented. Two of
the early leading articles include Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967), and
Summers, supra note 22. See also To Strike a New Balance, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Termination at Will and Wrongful DischargeAppointed by the Labor and Employment Law Section of the State Bar of California,LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW NEws, Feb.
8, 1984 (publication of the State Bar of California Labor and Employment Law Section). For
contrary views, see Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947
(1984); Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 881 (1983).
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and the degree to which the

basic human rights of individual autonomy and privacy are protected
from invasion in the workplace. While this Article cannot deal exhaustively with these global issues, they do underlie much of what
will be considered.
I.

MEDICAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE LEGAL ANALYSIS

The analysis of workplace legal issues which follows is predicated upon an understanding of medical facts about AIDS.25
First, AIDS is the end stage of complications of infection by a
retrovirus 26 which will be referred to herein as HIV (Human Immu24. For example, the National Labor Relations Act protects employees who "engage-in
...concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection" from employer discipline. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Concerted refusals of employees to work due to health- and safety-related fears have been held to be protected concerted activities. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). However, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits federal agency employers and employers receiving federal
financial assistance from discriminating against the handicapped. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
Reactions of employees to the perceived health threat of AIDS in the workplace may bring the
two statutes into conflict. See infra notes 117 to 138 and accompanying text.
25. The following summary of medical facts about AIDS is derived from many sources,
and is an attempt to relate those facts pertinent to the legal analysis in a relatively nontechnical manner. Knowledge about the etiology of AIDS is constantly improving, although some
basic facts were well established early in the history of the epidemic. Some good sources
outside the technical medical journals current at the time of this writing include: A.G.
FETTNER & W.A. CHECK, THE TRUTH ABOUT AIDS: EVOLUTION OF AN EPIDEMIC (rev. ed.
1985); N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME: 100 QuESTIONS & ANSWERS (1985); J. SLAFF & J. BRUBAKER, THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: How YOU CAN
PROTECT YOURSELF AND YOUR FAMILY-WHY YOU MUST (1985); AIDS: THE EMERGING
ETHICAL DILEMMAS, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1985, at 1 (special supplement); Laurence,
The Immune System in AIDS, Sci. AM., Dec. 1985, at 84-93; Mass, Medical Answers About
AIDS (Gay Men's Health Crisis, Inc. 1985). An earlier publication which provides considerable insight although it predates the discovery of HIV is THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (Cahill ed.
1983).
The basic public health statement about AIDS in the workplace setting was published by
the Centers for Disease Control on November 15, 1985: Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/LymphadenopathyAssociated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 682-95
(Nov. 15, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Recommendations]. For further discussion of the CDC's
and other public health guidelines see: Acheson, AIDS: A Challengefor the Public Health,
LANCET, Mar. 22, 1986, at 662-66; Mason, Statement on the Development of Guidelinesfor
the Prevention of AIDS Transmission in the Workplace, 101 PUB. HEALTH RaP. 6-8 (Jan.Feb. 1986); The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Infection Control and Public Health
Law, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 931-36 (Apr. 3, 1986); Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome-United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17-21 (Jan. 17,
1986) [hereinafter cited as Update: United States]. For anthology treatment of coverage of
developments on AIDS from the start of the epidemic through the end of 1985, see AIDS
FROM THE BEGINNING, supra note 1, and PAPERS FROM SCIENCE, supra note 1.
26. Retroviruses are distinguished from all other viruses by their means of replication
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The virus, which is bloodborne (specifically in

white blood cells known as T-4 helper lymphocytes), is transmitted
through the exchange of blood or semen during sexual intercourse,
or by the use of tainted blood or blood products, including blood
transfusions, shared intravenous needles, blood clotting medications,
and prenatal or natal exposure.2 8 No other mode of transmittal from

person to person has been documented, although HIV has been
found in saliva, urine, and tears of some infected persons. 29 HIV is
not spread through casual physical contact,30 and does not live
outside the body long enough in sufficient quantity to be spread by

food, drinking fountains, utensils, or toilet facilities."
Once introduced into the body, HIV produces an enzyme which
allows it to transcribe its genetic material onto the genetic material
and genetic properties. See NIH Conference, the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: An
Update, 102 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 800, 807 (June 1985) [hereinafter cited as NIH Conference]; Laurence, supra note 25, at 88.
27. The virus suspected of causing AIDS has been given different names by different
research teams. The French, who first isolated it, called it Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, or LAV. The American team at the National Institutes of Health called the variant it
isolated Human T-Lymphotropic Virus, Variant III (or HTLV-III), having concluded that it
is a variant of earlier discovered retroviruses implicated in T-cell infections. An American west
coast team adopted the name AIDS-Related Virus (ARV). D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 5051; J. SLAFF & J. BRUBAKER, supra note 25, at 131. In 1986, the International Committee for
the Taxonomy of Viruses announced the designation Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),
which will probably become the standard name for the virus. The Advocate, Aug. 19, 1986, at
23.
28. See Castro, Hardy & Curran, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Epidemiology and Risk Factorsfor Transmission, 70 MED. CLINICS N. Am. 635, 640-45 (May
1986); Health & Pub. Policy Comm., Am. College of Physicians & the Infectious Diseases
Soc'y of Am., Position Paper: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 104 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 575 (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter cited as Health & Pub. Policy Comm.]; Update: United
States, supra note 25, at 682.
29. Health & Pub. Policy Comm., supra note 28, at 575; Update: United States, supra
note 25, at 682.
30. See Krim, AIDS: The Challenge to Science and Medicine, in AIDS: THE EMERGING
ETHICAL DILEMMAS, HASTINGS CENTER

REP., Aug. 1985, at 2, 4 (special supplement). See

also Health & Pub. Policy Comm., supra note 28, at 575 (there is no documented evidence
that handshaking, sharing common drinking glasses, clothing, toilets, or air space transmits
HIV). A recent study indicates that household members who have no sexual or perinatal contact with persons infected with HIV are at minimal risk of infection. See Friedland, Saltzman,
Rogers, Kahl, Lesser, Mayers & Klein, Lack of Transmission of HTLV-Ill/LA V Infection to
Household Contacts of Patients With AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex With Oral
Candidiasis,314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 344 (Feb. 6, 1986).
31. See Recommendations, supra note 25, at 693 ("All epidemiologic and laboratory
evidence indicates that bloodborne and sexually transmitted infections are not transmitted during the preparation or serving of food or beverages ....
"). But see AIDS-Associated Virus
Yields Data to Intensifying Scientific Study, 254 J. A.M.A. 2865, 2866 (Nov. 22-29, 1985)
(the AIDS virus does exist outside the body for a certain time period).
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of the T-4 lymphocytes, thus altering the lymphocytes and impeding
their growth and replication.3 2 The T-4 lymphocytes play an important role in triggering immune response to certain organisms which
are already present in large portions of the population. 3 Having performed its transcription function, HIV may remain "dormant" in the
T-4 lymphocytes and never cause any further damage to the immune
system. However, there is evidence that HIV sometimes crosses the
blood-brain barrier3 4 and infects brain cells, resulting in dementia or
meningitis, and also infects cells of the central nervous system in
some individuals.3 5 The most significant and lethal activity of HIV,
which seems to be triggered by unidentified cofactors,3 6 is the stimulated replication of infected T-4 lymphocytes, rapidly reproducing in
the form of new HIV, which then attacks remaining healthy T-4
lymphocytes until there are few healthy ones left.37 During the intermediate stage of infection, when the number of healthy T-4 lymphocytes is reduced, the individual may experience various symptoms
38
which are referred to as AIDS-Related Complex.
32. See, e.g., Gottlieb, Immunologic Aspects of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Male Homosexuality, 70 MED. CLINICS N. AM. 651, 657 (May 1986); Krim, supra
note 30, at 4; Laurence, supra note 25, at 88-90.
33. See Gottlieb, supra note 32, at 651, 654; Laurence, supra note 25, at 88-90.
34. The blood-brain barrier prevents the free exchange of substances in the circulation
into brain tissue. See Pardridge, Olendorf, Cancilla & Frank, Blood-Brain Barrier:Interface

Between Internal Medicine and the Brain, 105

ANNALS INTERNAL MED.

82 (July 1986).

35.

See HTLV-Ill and the Brain: Is Consent Affected?, in AIDS: THE EMERGING ETHICAL DILEMMAS, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1985, at 18 (special supplement); Meer, AIDS:
The Neurological Connection, 20 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 10 (Jan. 1986). See also Health &
Pub. Policy Comm., supra note 28, at 575 (the neurologic and encephalopathic manifestations
of AIDS raise the possibility of chronic neurologic disability for an unknown number of
patients).
36. Krim, supra note 30, at 4. See also Health & Pub. Policy Comm., supra note 28, at
575 ("Cofactors that may predispose to or promote the development of the infection are poorly
understood."). Cf. Curran, Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe, Dorrow & Dowdle, The Epidemiology of
AIDS: Current Status and Future Prospects, 229 ScL. 1352, 1356 (Sept. 1985) (while
cofactors may modify the course of infection, they are not likely to be essential for AIDS to
develop in an individual with HIV).
37. See, e.g., Krim, supra note 30, at 4-5. Cf.AIDS Therapy: A Step Closer?, 107
NEWSWEEK 60 (Feb. 24, 1986) (a newly discovered peculiarity about how the AIDS virus
carries out its cellular subversion may lead to new drug therapy that would prevent further
virus production).
38. The CDC has not adopted an official surveillance definition of ARC, for which it
does not collect statistics, but many clinicians define ARC as a condition involving two or more
of the symptoms which have been identified as characteristic of development of the syndrome
(such as enlarged lymph nodes, oral thrush, shingles, weight loss, persistent fevers or night
sweats, persistent dry cough or diarrhea, fatigue, etc.) in combination with clinical tests showing compromise of immune function. Mass, supra note 25, at 13, 15-17, 21-22. See also Gottlieb, supra note 32, at 655 (discussing features of ARC); Young, Management of Opportunis-
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Infected T-4 lymphocytes are unable to perform their normal

immune system functions, which results in proliferation of common
(and usually harmless) parasites, producing lymphadenopathy (enlarged lymph nodes), Kaposi's sarcoma (a form of skin cancer),

pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, and other opportunistic infections39
characteristic of end-stage AIDS. The CDC has defined AIDS, for
epidemiological surveillance purposes, as a reliably diagnosed disease
predictive of immune deficiency in a person with no known underlying cause of immune deficiency.40 However, as can be seen from this
description, end-stage (or CDC-defined) AIDS is only one of several

manifestations of HIV infection, which are lumped together in the
public mind as AIDS. 1
One of the medical facts which makes AIDS a significant workplace issue is that a person may experience HIV infection in its various stages and be virtually asymptomatic, or have symptoms which,

while uncomfortable, are not actually disabling. 42 Indeed, some individuals with CDC-defined AIDS are, apart from such nondisabling
conditions as early-stage Kaposi's sarcoma,4 a in relatively good
health and physically able to function at work, and there are some
people who have lived and worked for months or years after a con-

firmed AIDS diagnosis."4 AIDS is a disability of the immune system,
tic Infections Complicating the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 70 MED. CLINICS N.
AM. 677, 680 (May 1986) (whether or not all patients with ARC are likely to develop typical
AIDS is unclear).
39. An opportunistic infection is an illness that occurs when the function of the immune
system is depressed. See A.G. FETTNER & W.A. CHECK, supra note 25, at 22-23. Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia is the most common AIDS-associated opportunistic disease, while
Kaposi's sarcoma is the second most common. See Update: United States, supra note 25, at
18. See also Castro, Hardy & Curran, supra note 28, at 635-36 (11 opportunistic infections
and diseases are indicative of AIDS). For a current discussion of the medical management of
opportunistic infections, see Young, supra note 38, at 677-92.
40. Revision of the Case Definition of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome for National Reporting-United States, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 373 (June 28,

1985).
41. See Castro, Hardy & Curran, supra note 28, at 635 (because CDC's definition emphasizes specificity, cases that fit the AIDS definition represent only the "tip of the iceberg" of
the disease spectrum).
42. Abrams, Dilley, Maxey & Volberding, Routine Care and PsychosocialSupport of
the Patient With the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 70 MED. CLINICS N. Abs. 707,
709 (May 1986). See also Acheson, supra note 25, at 662 ("[T]here is a period of infectivity
lasting months or years in persons who are usually unaware that they are carrying the virus.").
43. Abrams, Dilley, Maxey & Volberding, supra note 42, at 709 (some patients with
Kaposi's sarcoma may remain essentially well for years).
44. See id. (after an initial diagnosis of AIDS, many patients experience healthy months
due to life-style alterations). See also id. at 715 (psychological counselors should communicate
their belief that AIDS patients can continue to function productively).
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but not itself an overtly disabling illness; rather, symptoms produced
by the body's reaction to organisms usually suppressed by the
healthy immune system, such as weakness, fatigue, severe weight
loss, and loss of respiratory and digestive function, are the overt
physical disabilities linked to AIDS. These eventually lead to death
in most CDC-defined AIDS cases. 5
For the purposes of discussion, the following typology of individ-

46
ual cases will be used:
Type I-Individuals who are members of groups perceived as
being at significant risk for HIV infection.47
Type II-Persons exposed to or infected by HIV (i.e., those who
are seropositive on available tests for HIV antibodies). 48
Type III-Persons experiencing AIDS-Related Complex
(ARC) 49 who are physically able to function in the workplace.
Type IV-Persons with confirmed CDC-defined AIDS 50 who
are physically able to function in the workplace.
Type V-Persons with AIDS-Related Complex or CDC-defined
AIDS who are not physically able to function in the workplace.

These categories are fluid because individuals will move back

and forth between them at various times. In the following analysis,
the legal issues may vary with respect to different categories. The
issue of contagion, however, is virtually the same with respect to
Types II through V.
45. "In New York City, 70% of all AIDS patients die within two years of diagnosis." D.
Sencer & V. Botnick, supra, note 6, at 1. The median survival time from date of diagnosis in
New York City, as of December 1985, was 14 months. Id. at 3.
46. This typology is a revision of one presented in my earlier Article. Leonard, supra
note 3, at 687.
47. The significant "risk groups" classified by the CDC are: sexually active homosexual/
bisexual men and their heterosexual sexual partners; intravenous drug users; consumers of
blood products (such as clotting medications for treatment of hemophilia) prior to widespread
use of the antibody test to exclude infected blood from use in manufacturing such products.
See Leonard, The Legal Issues, in AIDS: The Workplace Issues 28, 43-45 (American Management Association 1985). Early in the epidemic, recent immigrants from Haiti were classified as a risk group, due to the disproportionate number of cases occurring in that population,
but improved epidemiological evidence led to the assignment of many Haitian cases to other
risk categories and removal of Haitians as a distinct category. See D. ALTMAN, supra note 1,
at 71-73. For a comprehensive current discussion of risk factors for HIV transmission, see
generally Castro, Hardy & Curran, supra note 28, at 635. See also Miller, DeLuca & Ringler, AIDS In the Wife of a Bisexual Man, 86 N.Y. J. MED. 158 (March 1986) (discussing case
report which illustrates expansion of traditional risk groups).
48. See supra note 47.
49. See supra note 38.
50. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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II.

AIDS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

Persons in all the categories described above may find job protection from a variety of federal, state and local laws, ordinances,
and executive orders aimed at preventing employment discrimination
against persons with physical handicaps or disabilities. 1 Each state
has statutes or executive orders which prohibit employment discrimination on such a basis, either in the public sector, the private sector,

or both.52 These laws vary widely in their definitional language for
"handicap" or "disability," but the differences in language do not
seem to affect the determination whether AIDS comes within their
meaning. The initial determinations of administrators on this issue
have been unanimous in finding AIDS to be a covered condition.53
51. See Bayer & Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 31; Leonard, supra note 3, at 689-703
(discussing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and several state statutes which address the handicap discrimination issue); Stromberg, Law Notes: AIDS Poses Significant Legal Considerations for the Workplace, Bus. & HEALTH, Jan./Feb. 1986, at 30-31; Recent Developments:
Public Health and Employment Issues Generated By the AIDS Crisis, 25 WASHBURN LJ.
505, 524-31 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments].
52. See Leonard, supra note 3, at 689-93; Leap, State Regulation and Fair Employment of the Handicapped,5 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 382 (1979-80) (39 states had enacted legislation as of 1980). Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia has either statutory or
executive requirements of equal employment rights for the disabled, although in some jurisdictions (Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho and Mississippi at the time of writing) these apply
primarily to government employees. See Leonard, supra note 3, at 690 n.36. In several of the
states, gubernatorial executive orders or legislative enactments extend the nondiscrimination
requirement to programs receiving state financial assistance. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2901
(Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 56-707 (Supp. 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (1972); VA.
CODE § 51.01-40 (Supp. 1985); Exec. Order No. 78-4, 3 Emp. Prac. Guide (CCH) T 22, 365,
1 22,365.03 (Oct. 17, 1978) (issued by Idaho Governor John V. Evans). See also ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (1985) (amended 1985 to include handicap as a basis of unlawful employment discrimination); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-1 and § 20-13-10 (1986) (adding disability to private sector coverage); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (1986) (broadening
nondiscrimination requirement to extend to discharges); Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-105 (Supp. 1985)
(adding handicap discrimination to the Fair Employment Practices Act). State laws pertaining
to employment discrimination are conveniently collected and updated in looseleaf format in
LAB. REL REP. (BNA) Fair Emp. Prac. Man., vol. 8A and EMP. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH), vol. 3.
53. In District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502
N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986), a case involving the question whether children with HIV infection should automatically be excluded from attending public schools, the court noted that excluding the children might violate the Rehabilitation Act § 504, because AIDS and HIV infection fit the definition of handicap contained in the law. See also New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979), affg, 466 F. Supp. 479
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (segregation of retarded school children infected with hepatitis B held violative of § 504).
Formal opinions adopting the view that AIDS is a handicap or disability within the meaning of these laws have been issued by the Executive Director of the Florida Commission on
Human Relations in Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Mgm't Policy,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 242, at E-l, E-5 to E-6 (Dec. 17, 1985) (Fla. Comm'n on
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The policy choice reflected in these laws is to remove physical

condition as a basis for employment decisionmaking in cases where
the physical condition at issue does not prevent the individual from
performing the job.5 4 This is especially well illustrated by the concept of "perceived disability," contained in many of the statutes,55
which extends protection to people who are not actually disabled in
any way but who suffer discrimination due to beliefs or prejudices
surrounding their physical condition.56 Given this underlying policy,
Human Relations Dec. 11, 1985) (construing statute which does not define handicap); the
New York State Division of Human Rights, AIDS-Based Discrimination,3 EMP. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH)
26,165 (Oct. 1985); the Legislative Counsel of California, Letter from Bion M.
Gregory to the Hon. Art Agnos (Nov. 7, 1985) (discussing application of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act to alleged discrimination against AIDS victims by employers);
the Corporation Counsel's Office in the District of Columbia, Letter from John H. Suda to
Councilmember John Ray (Oct. 15, 1985) (discussing the applicability of the D.C. Human
Rights Act of 1977 to AIDS victims). See also Massachusetts Employers Warned Against
Bias, 1 AIDS PoL'Y & LAW (BNA) 5 (Apr. 23, 1986); Maine Law Bars Discrimination,
Panel Says, I AIDS POL'Y & LAW (BNA) 6 (Apr. 9, 1986); AIDS Held To Be Handicap
Under Oregon Law, I AIDS PoL'Y & LAW (BNA) 6 (Mar. 26, 1986); Racine Educ. Ass'n v.
Racine United School Dist., Equal Rights Div. Case No. 50279 (Wis. Dep't Indus. Lab.
Human Relations, Apr. 30, 1986) (available DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 98, at E-I (May
21, 1986)) (Wisconsin agency holds policy based on AIDS violates state handicap discrimination law).
A memorandum issued by the Office of Legal Counsel to the Department of Health and
Human Services in June 1986 concluded that CDC-defined AIDS, and probably most cases of
ARC, would be considered handicaps under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, but that seropositivity would not meet the statutory definition. Cooper, supra note 21. The Office of Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, held AIDS to be a covered handicap in In
re Charlotte Memorial Hosp., No. 04-84-3096 (Region IV, Aug. 5, 1986). Thus far, the only
negative ruling on this question is an Administrative Law Judge's determination in Chadbourne v. Raytheon Corp., Cal. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, Case No. FEP 83-84
LI-031p (Aug. 4, 1986) (Richard J. Lopez, ALJ).
54. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1421-24 (9th Cir., 1985); Bentivegna v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1982); E.E. Black, Ltd. v.
Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1096-1102 (D. Hawaii 1980). See generally NORTHRUP, OLD
AaE, HANDICAPPED, AND VIETNAM-ERA ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 87-107 (rev. ed.
1980) (detailed review of Rehabilitation Act enforcement issues); Hunt, The Total Gene
Screen, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 33, 59 (discussing whether society's
obligation to help the handicapped lead a full life, in part by eradicating job discrimination
against the handicapped whenever "reasonable accommodation" of the work environment is
economically feasible, exacts too high a social cost in terms of lower efficiency and higher costs
of goods and services).
55. See Leonard, supra note 3, at 691.
56. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Hawaii 1980):
[Congress's] intent was to protect people who are denied employment because of an
employer's perceptions, whether or not those perceptions are accurate. It is of little
solace to a person denied employment to know that the employer's view of his or her
condition is erroneous. To such a person the perception of the employer is as important as reality.
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it is understandable that enforcement agencies will construe their
statutes, even where the definitional language does not on its face

necessarily support such a construction,5 to include the AIDS
situation.
In addition to state laws prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of physical condition, there are several local ordinances
adopted by California municipalities which expressly prohibit employment discrimination against persons with AIDS, as well as use
of medical procedures to screen employees. 58

At least two federal statutes may apply to AIDS-based employment discrimination. The Rehabilitation Act of 197359 contains provisions requiring federal agencies and contractors to adopt affirmative action programs with respect to the handicapped.

0

The Act also

prohibits federal agency employers from discriminating against the
handicapped, 61 and imposes a similar nondiscrimination requirement
57.

See, e.g., Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Mgm't Policy,

DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 242, at E-1, E-5 to E-6 (Dec. 17, 1985) (Fla. Comm'n on

Human Relations Dec. 11, 1985). In Shuttleworth, although the Florida statute outlawing
employment discrimination against the handicapped, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West Supp.
1985), contained no definition of "handicap," the Florida Commission on Human Relations
relied on the definition of "handicap" found in the Florida Fair Housing Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 760.22 (5) (West Supp. 1985), and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, 29
C.F.R. § 32.3 (1985), designed to implement § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982), in holding that AIDS is included within the scope of the term
"handicap" as used in the Florida employment discrimination statute. Shuttleworth's discharge will also be challenged in a combined constitutional and § 504 action pending in Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 406 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 1986)
(overruling motion to dismiss by employer).
58. San Francisco Ordinance No. 49985, 3 EMPL PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 20,950B (Dec.
20, 1985) (to be codified at SAN FRANCISCO, CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE Pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 38,
§§ 3801-3816). Los Angeles Ordinance No. 160289, 3 EMPL PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 20,950A

(Aug. 16, 1985) (to be codified at Los

ANGELES, CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE

ch. III, art. 5.8, §§

45.80-.93); ordinances passed by West Hollywood, San Jose, Oakland, and some other municipalities are not yet published by generally available labor law reporting sources. Many cities
have adopted ordinances forbidding employment discrimination on the basis of physical disability or handicap. Unfortunately, these local laws are not collected and published in any comprehensive cumulation, but must be located by researching individual municipal codes. See,
e.g., NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ BI-7.0 to -7.1 (Supp. 1985-86).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982).
60. Section 501, 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1982) (federal agency employers); § 503, 29
U.S.C. § 793 (1982) (federal contractors). While this provision does not expressly forbid employment discrimination, its requirement of affirmative action to hire handicapped individuals
has been construed to authorize the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs to receive and process complaints of handicapped individuals of discrimination by federal contractors. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26 (1985).
61. Sections 501, 504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (1982), which are enforced by the Office
of Civil Rights of each federal agency.
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upon programs receiving federal financial assistance.6 2 The definition
of "handicap" under the federal law is quite broad, 6a and definitions
contained in implementing regulations issued by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs 6 4 and the Department of Health
and Human Services, 65 appear by their breadth to confirm the initial
interpretation by agency officials that AIDS will be considered a
handicap under this law. 6
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)6 7 may also provide some coverage in situations where employees who are covered by employee benefit plans are discharged

after an ARC or AIDS diagnosis or a positive antibody test result.
62. Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). This provision has been construed to create a
private right of action in federal court for employment discrimination. See Arline v. School
Bd., 772 F.2d 759 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986) (handicap discrimination claim by teacher with tuberculosis creates private right of action); Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1984). In Darrone,the Supreme Court held that the
1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 505, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982), adopting the rights and remedies provided in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, did not
incorporate the limitation found in § 604 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1982), which
provides that employment discrimination is actionable only when the "primary objective" of
the federal assistance received by the employer is "to provide employment." Id. at 632-34. In
United States Dep't of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans, 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986), the
Supreme Court ruled that only direct financial assistance to the entity charged with discrimination would serve to impose the § 504 requirement. A private action for monetary relief may
not, however, be brought against a state government employer under § 504, Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985), under current Supreme Court interpretation of
I Ith Amendment sovereign immunity principles.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982). The definition provides that "handicapped individual"
means "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii)
is regarded as having such an impairment." Id. at § 706(7)(B). The leading case construing
this provision, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980), essentially
interprets it as meaning that "Congress wanted those individuals who either had or were perceived as having physical or mental conditions that disqualified them from employment to be
considered as either impaired or regarded as impaired." Id. at 1098. Expressly excluded from
this definition are drug abusers "whose current use of. . . drugs prevents such individual from
performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current
.. . drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others." 29
U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). Because intravenous drug users are a major AIDS risk group,
there is a certain inherent tension in resorting to the Rehabilitation Act to protect such individuals from AIDS-related discrimination, if their drug habit might prevent performance of
job duties.
64. 41 C.F.R. ch. 60, app., pt. 60-1.3 (1985) (OFCCP is the enforcement agency for
violations of § 503).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j), (k) (1985).
66. See Cooper, supra note 21.
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
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Section 5108 bans discharges intended to deprive employees of benefits to which they are entitled under benefit plans. 9 Benefit plans are
broadly defined, and include plans providing health care benefits and

coverage, as well as pensions and life insurance. 70 Some federal
courts have held that the discharge of an employee who has been
diagnosed with an expensive-to-treat ailment would create a cause of
action under this provision,71 which is enforceable by direct suit in
72
federal court.
The question whether interpretations of these state and federal
laws as applied to the AIDS situation will hold up to court challenge
is problematic, for courts may be more inclined than civil rights
agencies to engage in the "rights balancing" characteristic of judicially developed employment law doctrines.7 3 Furthermore, a deter68. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
69. Id. The section specifically provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any
person to discharge ....
suspend, expel, discipline or discriminate against a participant or
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee
benefit plan. . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which
such participant may become entitled under the plan .... " Id. For a detailed discussion of
the legislative history and developing case law under § 510, see Martucci & Utz, Unlawful
Interference With Protected Rights Under ERISA, 2 THE LAB. LAW. 251 (Spring 1986).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2), (3) (1982).
71. A recent decision supporting this cause of action is Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F.
Supp. 1007, 1014-15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), in which the court held that an employee with a good
work record who was suddenly discharged after receiving a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis
stated a cause of action under § 510 of ERISA. Note, however, that several courts have held
that the federal courts have the authority to require that the employee first exhaust available
appeals remedies provided by the benefit plan before bringing a federal court action. See Kross
v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1243-46 (7th Cir. 1983); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d
559, 566-68 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Janowski v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local No.
710 Pension Fund, 673 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1982) (exhaustion doctrine not applicable
where the issue before the court is solely one of statutory interpretation). The applicability of
an exhaustion requirement to this type of case seems questionable, since internal appeals procedures under employee benefit plans usually deal solely with claims for benefits under the
plan rather than claims of unlawful discharge. Accord Zipf v. AT&T, No. 85-3420 (3d Cir.
1986) (available DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 171, at E-I (Sept. 4, 1986)).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982). The Secretary of Labor may also bring suit on behalf of a plan participant pursuant to § 1132(a)(5).
73. Recent labor law scholarship has noted that, in many instances, the courts have
restricted employee rights that seem to be clearly articulated in statutory language based on a
view of the countervailing rights of management not necessarily found on the face of the pertinent statute. Perhaps the most articulate exposition of this view is contained in J. ATLFsON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983). This is evidenced by cases dealing with employer prerogatives in making decisions that may significantly affect working con-

ditions without engaging in collective bargaining, First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666 (1981), and in cases involving the right of employers to post their premises
against nonemployee union organizers, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105
(1956), and to replace economic strikers permanently, NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co.,
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mination that AIDS is a handicap within the meaning of these laws
is just the beginning of the inquiry, because these employment dis-

crimination statutes permit the exclusion of a handicapped person if
(1) that person cannot physically perform the job; (2) the person's

presence creates a health or safety problem for himself or others; or
(3) the special problems created by a person with the handicap could

not be accommodated without undue burden on the employer.74 The
degree of protection a handicap discrimination law will extend to a
person with AIDS will thus depend upon that person's actual physical condition, the nature of the job, and the changing views about
75
AIDS and transmissibility of HIV.
Certainly, in jurisdictions where the concept of "perceived
304 U.S. 333 (1938). The same tendency may explain the judicially imposed requirement that
union strikes over health and safety issues in violation of a no-strike clause during the term of
a collective agreement must be based on "objective" evidence of "abnormally dangerous" conditions. See Gateway Coal Co. v. U.M.W., 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974). See generally Atleson, Threats to Health and Safety: Employee Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REv.
647 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Atleson, Threats] (arguing that a subjective good faith or
reasonableness standard would more equitably balance the competing interests of employers
and employees when employees strike over perceived dangerous work conditions).
74. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (construing the phrase "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" in § 794 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 to mean a person "who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his
handicap"); Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 764-65 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 1633 (1986) (analyzing accommodation requirement once condition is found to be real or
perceived handicap); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1421-23 (9th Cir. 1985) (analyzing
risk to safety of self or others as a factor in Rehabilitation Act analysis). See also Leonard,
supra note 3, at 693-695, 696-701, for a review of employer defenses under handicap discrimination laws.
75. The sort of inquiry to be undertaken by a judicial decisionmaker in a case of this
sort was described by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d
759, 764-65 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986), as follows:
The court is obligated to scrutinize the evidence before determining whether the
defendant's justifications [for the discharge] reflect a well-informed judgment
grounded in a careful and open-minded weighing of the risks and alternatives, or
whether they are simply conclusory statements that are being used to justify reflexive reactions grounded in ignorance or capitulation to public prejudice.
Id. The Ninth Circuit, in Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985),
commented:
[I]n order to exclude such individuals, there must be a showing of a reasonable
probability of substantial harm. Such a determination cannot be based merely on an
employer's subjective evaluation or, except in cases of a most apparent nature,
merely on medical reports. The question is whether, in light of the individual's work
history and medical history, employment of that individual would pose a reasonable
probability of substantial harm.
Id. The court noted that Congress' intent was "to prevent employers from refusing to give
much needed opportunities to handicapped individuals on the basis of misinformed stereotypes." Id.
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handicap"' 8 is recognized, Type I persons (risk group members) will
be considered "handicapped" under the law and none of the usual
employer defenses will apply, because such individuals are neither
actually ill nor proven sources of infection. Indeed, Type II individuals (those exposed to or infected by HIV) should also be considered
"handicapped" in such jurisdictions and, given the well-established
facts about HIV transmission, 7 none of the employer defenses
should apply to them, either. In jurisdictions which do not recognize
the "perceived disability" concept, however, these individuals may
lack direct protection.
Types III and IV present a difficult problem on their face, because individuals may actually have ARC or AIDS and not have any
apparent physical disability at a given time. Should they be considered "handicapped" in a jurisdiction which does not recognize the
concept of "perceived handicap"? The underlying purpose of a
"handicap discrimination" statute would support coverage in these
cases, even though the definitional language of "handicap" in a particular statute may not, on its face, seem to cover the situation. Furthermore, the definitions of ARC and AIDS include physical symptoms that could be seen as evidence of some sort of "handicap."
Additionally, immune system compromise may be seen as the "impairment" which constitutes the disability.78 If statutory protection
does not extend to such situations, it is difficult to see how it could
ever extend to a progressively disabling illness (as opposed to an
injury) .9
76. See Leonard, supra note 3, at 691.
77. See Recommendations, supra note 25, at 682 ("The kind of nonsexual person-toperson contact that generally occurs among workers and clients of consumers in the workplace

does not pose a risk for transmission of HTLV-III/LAV.").
78.

Cooper, supra note 21, at D-7.

79. Admittedly, some courts in jurisdictions that do not recognize the concept of "perceived" handicap protection have held that serious, even potentially fatal illnesses, may be the

basis for discrimination when they are in periods of remission and thus nondisabling. The most
notorious case involved an Illinois woman with a cancerous condition, who had the misfortune
to be living in a jurisdiction where the pertinent statute contained no definition of "handicap."
Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, 89 Iii. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270 (1982). In Lyons, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a woman with uterine cancer was not handicapped within the

meaning of the Illinois Constitution or the Illinois Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped
Act, and dismissed her employment discrimination claim for failure to state a cause of action.

In this regard, the issue whether employees with cancer enjoy protection under disability discrimination statutes is closely analogous to the AIDS issue. By extending coverage to people
with "a record" of a disability (29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)), Congress clearly signalled its inten-

tion in the Rehabilitation Act to include cancer patients in remission as persons subject to
protection.
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Assuming that the statute is held to apply, however, the issue of
employer defenses is significant. Even though transmissibility is not
normally a valid defense in an AIDS case, an argument could be
made that a person with a compromised immune system should not
be exposed to the variety of infectious agents found in the workplace
for his or her own safety. This argument would be quite persuasive if
AIDS were a disease involving generalized loss of immune function,
or particular vulnerability to infectious agents found in some or all
workplaces. But the medical evidence is that AIDS involves a loss of
particularized immune function, and that the opportunistic infections associated with AIDS are caused by parasites that are normally present in most of the adult population." Consequently, medical authorities writing on AIDS have not suggested that persons with
ARC or AIDS need to be excluded from the workplace to prevent
them from contracting opportunistic infections. The medical evidence appears to indicate that they are just as likely to contract such
infections sitting at home as attending a job.
The accommodation issue can also present serious problems in
Type III and IV cases. It is likely that persons with ARC or AIDS
will have problems maintaining good attendance, due to the occasional need for treatment for ARC systems or opportunistic infections. Furthermore, ARC and AIDS tend to be debilitating, lessening the individual's stamina and ability to maintain a high degree of
effort throughout a full workday. Depending upon the nature of the
job and the needs (and particularly the size) of the employer's operation, it may be that accommodating the person with ARC or AIDS
will, in some circumstances, create an undue burden.81 This, however, will be a matter for the employer to prove objectively. More80. See Laurence, supra note 25, at 84.
81. The issue of accommodation, and most particularly the degree to which the accommodation requirement may be invoked to require more than minimal employer expenditures,
has been the subject of considerable debate by scholars. See, e.g., Note, A PrincipledLimitation for Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: The Integrity-of-the-ProgramTest, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1409 (1985); Note, Employment DiscriminationAgainst the Handicappedand
Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REv. 997
(1984); Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of DiscriminationUnder Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (1980); Comment, Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act: Analyzing Employment DiscriminationClaims, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
867 (1984). The relatively undemanding accommodation standard under Title VII in religious
discrimination cases, explicated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977),
does not seem relevant to the handicap situation, given the different legislative history and
purpose of the handicap discrimination statutes and the lack of a first amendment problem in

the background of the analysis.
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over, the defense will not be available prospectively, since speculation about long term future inability to meet work requirements is
not normally a permissible basis for present discrimination under

these statutes.82
Responding to a request for an opinion from the Department of
Health and Human Services on the applicability of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act 83 to the AIDS situation, Assistant Attorney
General Charles J. Cooper wrote a memorandum which came to
public attention late in June 1986." The Cooper memorandum rejects many of the interpretations embraced by state agency officials,
concluding that federal handicap discrimination law only forbids discrimination against those who suffer an actual physical impairment
or who are perceived, wrongly or rightly, as suffering such an actual
impairment.8 5 Because persons with CDC-defined AIDS, Types IV
and V in our classification scheme, have impaired immune function,
they would be considered "handicapped" under this analysis,88 and
those Type III individuals experiencing physical symptoms characteristic of immune deficiency would also be considered "handi82. State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 491 N.Y.S.2d 106
(1985) (speculation that obese job applicant will prove unable to work in future not valid
defense in disability discrimination action). Consideration of future problems is not totally
excluded, however. The court in E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii
1980) rejected the notion that "risk of future injury" could not be considered by an employer
faced with a job applicant who had a record of past back injuries, but noted that this risk
could not automatically be decided against the employee. Id. at 1104. In the case of AIDS, it
is likely that some percentage of employees in categories II and III, and probable that most
employees in categories IV and V, as described above, will go on to develop a severely disabling condition that will eventually preclude them from working, but this development will not
likely be due to their continued working or pose any direct threat to the health of their coworkers. There is a delicate balance to be struck in this sort of case, depending upon the employee's
current physical condition and medical prognosis and the demands of the job. One prominent
scholar, commenting on what an employer should have to show to justify refusal to hire an
individual shown by medical examination to be at "high risk" of developing an occupational
illness, included the following: "The examination, test, or procedure indicates that the applicant has a strong likelihood of developing a serious injury or illness in the not-too-distant
future and that the applicant's likelihood of injury or illness represents a significant variation
from the general worker population." Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility
to Occupational Illness, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1379, 1445 (1983).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 794. By virtue of Exec. Order No. 12250, 3 C.F.R. § 298 (1981),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 note (1982), President Reagan assigned to the Justice Department responsibility for coordinating implementation and enforcement of § 504 by executive agencies.
84. Cooper, supra note 21. See Pear, Rights Laws, supra note 21.
85. Cooper, supra note 21, at D-5 to D-6.
86. Id. at D-7 to D-9. Cooper concludes that persons with CDC-defined AIDS have, by
definition, an impairment of the hemic and lymphatic systems which affects major life activities. Id.
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capped. 87 However, Cooper does not consider asymptomatic infection to be an actual impairment, and would thus exclude
asymptomatic carriers of the virus (Type II) from the statutory definition," as well as uninfected members of so-called "risk groups"
who might encounter discrimination because of a perception that
they may be carrying, and capable of transmitting, the virus (Type
I).89
Furthermore, reasoning that ability to transmit an infectious
agent is not itself an "impairment" within the meaning of the statute
or regulations, Cooper argues that situations where individuals encounter discrimination because of fear of contagion rather than because of beliefs that they are physically unable to work are not
within the statutory prohibition of discrimination. 0 Cooper reasons
that a person with CDC-defined AIDS who is actually physically
impaired but otherwise qualified to work would not be protected
from discrimination motivated by fear of contagion, because the statute only forbids discrimination motivated "solely by reason of [the]
handicap.""' Under Cooper's interpretation, the lack of an objective
basis for fearing contagion would be irrelevant, so long as such
stated fears were not a pretext for discrimination based on actual
physical impairment. 2
Cooper notes that only "otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals are protected from discrimination. Without stating a firm
conclusion whether a person with AIDS is automatically "disquali87.

Id. at D-9. Cooper concludes that the decision whether persons with ARC are handi-

capped must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account whether their symptoms are
actually disabling. This follows logically from his refusal to regard seropositivity as a handicap
under the "regarded as" category. Id.

88. Id. at D-9 to D-10. Cooper's argument is essentially that asymptomatic infection
does not impair a major life activity (i.e., does not itself affect the individual's physical abilities), and thus does not meet the literal requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982), unless
the individual is suffering discrimination because his employer actually regards seropositivity

as a disabling condition. Id.
89. Id. at D-10. Here, as in the other categories discussed above, Cooper relies on a
distinction between those who suffer discrimination because it is feared that they can spread
the disease, and those who suffer discrimination because they are perceived as actually having
CDC-defined AIDS or ARC. Cooper would find the former not protected, while the latter

would be protected so long as the motivation for discrimination is their perceived physical
impairment rather than fears about their ability to spread infection. Id.
90. Id. at D-7 to D-9, D-10 to D-13.
91. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
92. Cooper, supra note 21, at D-10 to D-12. Cooper argues further that because of the
severity of AIDS, one cannot presume that such employer fears are pretextual merely because

they lack any scientific foundation. Id. at D-I1 to D-12.
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fled" by virtue of being able to transmit the viral agent, Cooper
states:
We do not believe that Congress intended enactment of section 504
substantially to rearrange human conduct with regard to contagious illnesses. Accordingly, we believe that a person capable of
communicating the AIDS virus is not "otherwise qualified" to participate in a covered program or activity unless the risk that he
poses to the health of other participants can be calculated with a
high degree of medical certainty and is low enough, without "substantial modifications
in the [ ] program," to be safely
93
disregarded.
This in effect places the burden on the discriminatee to establish that
he does not present a risk of contagion in the workplace.
Cooper's interpretation seems contrary to a regulation adopted
by the Department of Health and Human Services in construing the
statutory definition of handicap, and to the underlying policy of the
statute itself.9 4 The regulation states that handicap status extends to
a person who "has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
others toward such impairment; or. . . has none of the impairments
defined in . . . this section but is treated by a recipient as having

such an impairment." 95 The regulation includes an illustrative list of
"major life activities" including, most pertinently for this analysis,
"working," 9 6 and defines "impairment," as pertinent here, as "any
physiological disorder or condition
'

. . .

affecting one or more of the

7

following body systems,
then providing a comprehensive list of
body systems including several affected by the virus implicated in
AIDS.98
Under this definition, it seems clear that infection by the virus is
a physical impairment, since it is a condition which affects one or
more of the listed body systems, even in the absence of physical
93. Id. at D-13 (citations omitted).
94. Cooper's memo is also contrary to the recommended approach by the staff attorneys
in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, contained in Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division, Draft Memorandum From Stewart B. Oneglia To William Bradford
Reynolds, Coverage of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Apr. 1, 1986). See Pear, AIDS Victims Gain in Fight on Rights, N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
95. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1985).
96. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1985).
97. 45 C.F.R. ] 84.]36)(2)(i) (1985).
98. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:11

symptoms (other than antibody production). Furthermore, seropositivity is clearly an impairment under the regulatory definition of the

"regarded as having such an impairment" category because it may
prevent the employee from working due to the attitudes of others

toward this condition.
By focusing narrowly on the question whether capability of
transmitting the virus is an "impairment," Cooper misses the more
important motivational issues behind AIDS-based discrimination:
the employer's fear of economic impact and workplace disruption
due to the unfounded fears of fellow employees and the general pub-

lic. Cooper's response to the regulation is to dismiss it as not authorized by the statute and thus invalid, because it does not comport
with his view of a common-sense meaning of "impairment. '99 But
the regulation is fully compatible with the underlying philosophy of
the statute, which is to limit adverse employment decisions by federal agencies and recipients of federal assistance to those situations
in which employees' physical conditions are such as objectively to

justify removing them from the workplace.
In addition to contradicting a valid regulation, Cooper's assertion that fears of contagion, however irrational, may be used to justify discrimination against persons with CDC-defined AIDS, either
by rendering them "disqualified" or by labeling ability to transmit
the virus as "not a handicap," is fundamentally inconsistent with the
policy underlying section 504. Cooper argues that such discrimination has not occurred "solely by reason of [the] handicap," and thus
is not cognizable under section 504.100 He reaches this result by as99. Cooper, supra note 21, at D-8. Cooper relies on de la Torres v. Bolger, 610 F.
Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex.), af'd, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986), which held that left-handedness
was not a statutory handicap. To compare infection with HIV to naturally-occurring lefthandedness seems disingenuous, but one may well take issue with the Fifth Circuit's decision
in that case, for left-handedness is clearly a physiological condition that affects the neurological and musculoskeletal systems, and the more proper focus for the court might have been on
whether the left-handed postal worker in question was "otherwise qualified" for the position, or
whether a "reasonable accommodation" could have alleviated the production problems that led
to his discrimination claim. Cooper also relies on a definition found in E.E. Black, Ltd. v.
Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980), in which the court was faced with the question whether an applicant for a carpenter's position who had suffered back injuries was handicapped. The definition Cooper quotes ("any condition which weakens, diminishes, restricts, or
otherwise damages an individual's health or physical or mental activity") is one adopted for
purposes of the case by the Assistant Secretary of Labor and the administrative law judge
under § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982), governing employment practices of federal contractors,
in default of any statutory or regulatory definition of "impairment" under that section; the
court approved it using the normal deferential standard for reviewing agency interpretations.
100. Cooper follows the same approach in discussing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
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serting that the issues of infectiousness and physical impairment

should be treated as separate and distinct for purposes of identifying
the handicap which is the cause of the discrimination. But this ap-

proach fails to appreciate the critical distinction between diseases
which present a genuine issue of workplace contagion and those
which do not. The CDC Guidelines 0 1 and the overwhelming weight

of medical authority since their publication10 2 support the contention
that contagion in the workplace is a spurious issue in the case of
AIDS.10 3 To allow such a spurious issue to be used as a justification
for discrimination defeats one of the purposes articulated by Con-

gress for passing the statute, which was to "guarantee equal opportunity" so that handicapped persons would be able to live independently;10 4 rendering persons with AIDS or ARC (most of whom

Cooper concedes to be handicapped within the meaning of section
504) unemployable due to unjustified fears of workplace contagion
destroys their ability to live independently.10 5
Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986),
arguing that the tubercular school teacher was dismissed not because of any physical impairment caused by her illness, but rather because of fear of contagion, and consequently that she
should not be protected by the statute. Cooper, supra note 25, at D-9 n.70.
101. Recommendations, supra note 25.
102. Cooper, supra note 21, at D-3 to D-5. Cooper's attempt to create doubts about the
unanimity of medical opinion has already resulted in controversy about his opinion. See Pear,
U.S. Apologizes to AIDS Researcher, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1986, at D20, col. 4.
103. The only workplaces where transmission issues seem relevant are health care settings where needle-stick accidents may prove to be a transmission mode. Cooper, supra note
21, at D-4. Of course, employment requiring sexual contact of the type which can transmit the
virus would also present such a risk.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
105. Perhaps the most bizarre portion of the Cooper memorandum is the part headed
"Congressional Intent as Illuminated by the Background of Laws Dealing with Contagion," at
D-13 to D-16. Because the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act says nothing about
contagious conditions, Cooper argues that a negative inference should be drawn from Congressional silence in light of the long history of federal legislation authorizing public health officials
to undertake action to contain the spread of epidemics. If the virus implicated in AIDS were
spread through air, water, or food, such discussion might have some relevance to the issue, at
least with respect to the "otherwise qualified" portion of the § 504 formulation. But where
workplace contagion is not a serious issue, there is no basis for arguing that the history of
public health measures is of any weight in determining whether unjustified fears of contagion
would justify employment discrimination against persons with AIDS. The public health laws
Cooper relies upon empower the Public Health Service to make the decision whether isolation
or workplace exclusion of infected individuals is necessary to protect public health; the Public
Health Service has made that decision in its published Guidelines, supra note 25, and has
concluded that exclusion of seropositive persons or those suffering physical symptoms is not
required for public health reasons. Here as elsewhere, the Cooper memorandum's discussion of
AIDS is undermined by the looming shadow of the Supreme Court's consideration of Arline v.
School Bd., 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986), during the October 1986 Term, for the discussion seems
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In addition to advancing an unjustifiably narrow interpretation
of the Rehabilitation Act protections against discrimination, the Justice Department's adoption of the Cooper memorandum as its official
interpretation of section 504 is bad public policy. It is likely to undermine efforts by the Public Health Service and the Centers for
Disease Control to encourage voluntary submission to serological
testing by members of so-called "risk groups" as a means of preventing further spread of the virus. Additionally, it will be seen as federal authorization for employers to discriminate against employees
who have AIDS, ARC, or test positive, thus unnecessarily expanding
the number rendered unemployable, and placing an extra burden on
public welfare agencies at a time of governmental fiscal stringency. 106 It is to be hoped that the federal courts will reject the Justice Department's interpretation when they are presented with individual suits under section 504.107
Under traditional concepts of employment law, apparently not
modified by the passage of "handicap discrimination" statutes,10 8
persons who are physically unable to work are normally not entitled
to continued employment. As the law has developed during the twentieth century, exceptions to this concept have grown up, particularly
around disability due to pregnancy or other work-related injuries or
illnesses which can be expected to have a finite duration."' With the
advent of modern concepts of workers' compensation systems and
disability benefits programs, many employers follow the policy of
to have more potential relevance to the issue of tuberculosis (which is spread by an airborne
agent) and is undoubtedly a preview of the Justice Department's expected amicus curiae brief
in that case. An amicus curiae brief filed by the American Medical Association in Arline
specifically attacks the Cooper memorandum as an "incorrect" interpretation of § 504. DAILY
LAB. REP. No. 135, at D-1, D-7 to D-8 (July 15, 1986).
106. It may also be seen as a tacit authorization for employers to require serological
testing of applicants or current employees. See infra text accompanying notes 163-165.
107. In its decision in In re Charlotte Memorial Hosp., No. 04-84-3096 (Region IV,
Aug. 5, 1986), the Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services has
already adopted a narrow construction of the Cooper opinion. Although the employer's asserted motivation for discharging a registered nurse with AIDS was fear of workplace contagion, OCR ruled that discrimination occurred because the hospital employer's normal policies
for dealing with employees with infectious conditions were not followed.
108. See Leonard, supra note 3, at 689-90.
109. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) provides that it is unlawful for an
employer "to discriminate against any individual

. . .

because of such individual's

. . .

sex."

Section 2000e(k) provides that the term "because of sex" as used in the statute includes "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." Section
2000e(k) also provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes as other persons similar
in their working ability."
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placing temporarily disabled employees on medical or disability
leave, with the understanding that a return to work is possible when
the disability ends. 110 Type V persons (ARC or AIDS sufferers who
are not physically able to function in the workplace) may well qualify for this type of treatment since, despite the ultimately terminal
nature of CDC-defined AIDS, it is not uncommon for people with
ARC or AIDS to go through alternating cycles of ill health and normal health. Even though it is highly unlikely that most cases of HIV
infection or AIDS are work-related (and thereby covered by the
workers compensation concept), it would seem appropriate to treat
all but the most severe and apparently irreversible end-stage cases as
temporary disability cases. Thus, employees who are presently unable to work due to AIDS should be treated in the same manner as
others, such as pregnant women, by placing them on the same type
of leave arrangement.
Indeed, the loss of the financial benefits, especially medical insurance, associated with employment may present a greater problem
in AIDS cases than the actual loss of employment. The primary aim
of enforcement agencies which receive employment discrimination
charges may be the continuation of some level of employee status so
that the financial support systems so badly needed at this time of
medical crisis will not be suddenly taken away."""
If the employer's concern about medical costs is the motivating
factor in removing the employee from the workplace, the ERISA
provision mentioned above may come into play."1 2 If this little-noted
provision is exploited to the extent its language will bear, a major
change in the underlying legal assumptions governing the employment relationship could result. The traditional rule that an employer
need not retain in his employ an individual who is not presently
physically capable of performing could be effectively eliminated. A
rule that employees who have worked long enough to qualify for
medical benefit coverage may not be discharged solely on the basis
of a medical condition for which they are entitled to benefits would
110.

See generally Skagen & Aberth, supra note 8, at 11-27 (discussing management

responses to AIDS issues and invoking some common practices for dealing with disabling
illnesses).

11.

In discussing the work of the New York City Commission on Human Rights in

dealing with AIDS-related employment discrimination cases, the authors of a report to New

York's Mayor stress that a major accomplishment connected with reinstatement is that "invaluable insurance coverage which had been lost in the process of termination was re-obtained."
D. Sencer and V. Botnick, supra note 6, at 43.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
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make sense under the predominantly private American health care
system, under which health insurance coverage is typically obtained
as part of employee compensation. Depriving the employee of the
benefit of such coverage when he becomes ill is tantamount to withholding wages that have been earned.11 3 It would seem perverse public policy to allow employers to reap benefits in employee loyalty and
labor peace by promising medical benefits for their employees but to
allow them to discharge those employees when they become ill, leaving them without benefit protection, thus shifting their costs to gov11
ernment assistance rolls. 4
Much of this discussion about the impact of employment discrimination laws in the context of AIDS is, admittedly, speculative.
There is no reason, however, under these statutes, to treat AIDS differently from other noncontagious conditions which, for some of
their duration, allow the person with the condition to function physically in a workplace setting.11 5 If not for the widespread public fears
about AIDS, there would be no reason to give it any special treatment at all.' 16
113. D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 120-21. Of course, this principle would not require the
employer to keep such an employee on the job. Rather, the principle would require that the
employment relation not be severed, so that the employee would retain the right to benefits
that would be lost through termination of the relationship. Unpaid medical leave might be the
appropriate status for such an employee.
114. The intention expressed by some representatives of the health insurance industry is
to avoid having to incur the costs of providing medical benefits to some persons with AIDS
through aggressive underwriting and to use, where legal, the HIV antibody test as a screen for
individual policy applicants. This merely reinforces the importance of ERISA and handicap
discrimination laws as a means of enabling employees who develop AIDS to continue their
employment status, at least for purposes of medical and life insurance coverage. See Bayer &
Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 33-34. On the significant costs that loss of employee health
coverage would shift to the public sector, see D. ALTMAN, supra note 1, at 119-26; Waldman,
The Other AIDS Crisis: Who Pays for the Treatment?, THE WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1986, at
25-31. For a cogent argument against the use of HIV antibody tests by insurance companies,
see B. Schatz, C. Heilmann & W. Warner, AIDS and Insurance, in A Dialog on Industry
Issues 3, 4-6 (NILS Publishing Co. December 1985).
115. In this regard, AIDS probably presents a clearer case for protection under disability discrimination law than does tuberculosis (a condition held to constitute a handicap in
Arline v. School Bd., 722 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986)),
given current medical knowledge about the lack of danger of HIV contagion in workplace
settings. Tuberculosis, by contrast, is spread by a mycobacterium, characterized as aerobic,
transmitted "mainly by contact with the sputum or saliva of infected persons." J.E. SCHMIDT,
ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE T-138 (1979 ed.); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1656 (25th ed. 1979).
116. In addition to the statutory protection against employment discrimination, it should
be recalled that about a fifth of the civilian workforce is covered by collective bargaining
agreements which may provide a source of protection to those employees in an AIDS-related
discrimination case, due to the applicability of a "just cause" standard for dismissal. See Leo-
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III.

LABOR RELATIONS LAW ISSUES

AIDS in the workplace can be expected to present some difficult
questions under the National Labor Relations Act.11 7 Public hysteria
about AIDS has created situations in some workplaces where coworkers or supervisors genuinely, if misguidedly, fear working next
to a person with AIDS. These f-ears can result in pressures on the

employer to remove the person with AIDS from the situation." 8
Should the sincerity of these fears insulate the coworkers from employer discipline, especially if the coworkers take concerted action on
the basis of such fears?
Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act" 9

protect employees who engage in concerted activities for mutual aid
or protection from employer discipline or discharge. The courts and
the National Labor Relations Board have held that concerted refusals of employees to work due to safety or health fears may come
within this statutory protection.

20

In perhaps the most important of

these cases, NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.,1 21 the Supreme
Court said in dicta that the reasonableness of the employees' con-

certed refusal to work was not an issue, so long as they were acting
in good faith.1 22 If employees engage in a protected refusal to work,
nard, supra note 3, at 688 n.32. For a detailed recent treatment of the application of the "just
cause" standard by labor arbitrators, see A. KOVEN & S. SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN
TEsrs (1985). There is also a possibility that employees with AIDS encountering discrimination might obtain redress through common law actions. See CaliforniaOffers Lessons on Handling AIDS, Lawyer Says, I AIDS POL'Y & LAW (BNA) 8 (Aug. 27, 1986).
117. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
118. See N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, supra note 8, at 2-8.
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1982).
120. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Cf. NLRB v.
City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 882 (1984) (Supreme Court accepted theory that individual
raising a safety complaint under a collective bargaining agreement is protected); Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 NLRB 493 (1984) (NLRB refused to extend constructive concerted activity
theory to a nonunion setting).
121. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
122. Id. at 16. Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated: "[I]t has long been settled
that the reasonableness of workers' decisions to engage in concerted activity is irrelevant to the
determination of whether a labor dispute exists or not." Id. Black cited as authority NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 344 (1938), which rejected the test of reasonableness in a non-health and safety context. Black noted that the evidence in Washington Aluminum showed that the employees acted reasonably in that case, thus making his comment as to
the irrelevance of employee reasonableness a dictum rather than part of the holding of the
case. However, the dictum has been followed as if it were holding. See, e.g., NLRB v. Modern
Carpet Indus., Inc., 611 F.2d 811, 814-15 (10th Cir. 1979) (employees who refused to work
for fear of radiation were protected as long as their refusal was based on a good faith belief
that working under those conditions was dangerous).
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the employer may not discharge them, but may replace them, either
permanently or temporarily. Employees enjoy this protection as long
as their union representative has not waived their right to strike.12 3
Even if such a waiver has taken place, section 502 of the Act 24 may
protect employees if they have an objective basis for their good faith
belief that the condition they are protesting is "abnormally
1' 25
dangerous.
In recent years, the National Labor Relations Board appears to
have adopted a more demanding standard for the protection of employee work refusals under section 8(a)(1). It has narrowed the definition of "concertedness" found in earlier case law, 26 and it has be123. A union may waive statutory rights of employees in the collective bargaining agreement, including the right to strike. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705
(1983); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967). Employees' right to
strike is considered by the Supreme Court to be a quid pro quo for the employer's acceptance
of grievance and arbitration provisions. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 567 (1960).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982). Section 502 was added to the original National Labor
Relations Act by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.
125. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 386-87 (1974) ("a union seeking to
justify a contractually prohibited work stoppage under § 502 must present 'ascertainable, objective evidence supporting its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work
exists' ") (quoting Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1162 (1972) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting)). See generally Atleson, Threats, supra note 73 (arguing that Supreme Court was
incorrect in adopting an objective standard under § 502). Of course, if an employer takes
disciplinary action against an employee in a case where there is a union contract containing a
grievance and arbitration procedure, the Board will in the first instance defer the case to grievance arbitration consistent with the Congressional policy favoring resolution of labor disputes
through arbitration. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971). Once the arbitrator has
rendered his decision, the Board will defer to the arbitrator's decision provided: (1) the proceedings before the arbitrator were fair and regular; (2) all parties agreed to be bound by the
arbitrator's decision; (3) the arbitrator's decision is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the National Labor Relations Act; and (4) there is factual parallelism between the
contractual and statutory cases. See Speilberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080, 1082 (1955) (establishing the first three requirements); Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984) (establishing
fourth component). A refusal by the Board to defer to an arbitrator's decision, where the
articulated requirements have been met, may constitute an abuse of discretion. See American
Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Richmond Tank Car Co. v.
NLRB, 721 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1983).
126. Compare Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 NLRB 493, 497 (1984), rev'd sub nom., Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (an employee's activity is "concerted" if it is "engaged
in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee
himself.") with Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 NLRB 999, 1000 (1975) ("[W]here an employee
speaks up and seeks to enforce statutory provisions relating to occupational safety designed for
the benefit of all employees, in the absence of any evidence that fellow employees disavow such
representation, we will find an implied consent thereto and deem such activity to be concerted."). The discussion of this issue in Recent Developments, supra note 51, at 531-34, appears to have been written in ignorance of recent developments under the NLRA.
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gun to require some "reasonableness" in the employee's actions. 127
This might reflect a view by the Board that the underlying policy of
the Labor Act was not intended to protect clearly unreasonable refusals to work, but the Board has not expressly articulated reasons

for this shift. Indeed, a reading of pertinent cases indicates that the
Board probably did not intend to make any significant change in the
standard. However, it would appear an irrational interpretation of
the statute to extend protection to work refusals stemming from

delusions or a wilful refusal to consider objective evidence of safety
presented by an employer.
Under current Board law, in the absence of an existing collective bargaining agreement, the protections of the National Labor
Relations Act do not extend to work refusals by individual employees.112 Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Act deal solely with concerted
127. Compare Johnson-Stewart-Johnson Mining Co., 263 NLRB 123, 123 (1982)
("Protesting an unsafe working condition can be protected activity under the Act if the employee so protesting has a good faith, reasonable belief that such a condition exists.") with
Wagner-Smith Co., 262 NLRB 999, 999 n.2 (1982) ("[I]t is well settled that the merit of a
complaint or grievance is irrelevant to the determination of whether an employee's conduct is
protected under the Act, so long as the complaint was not made in bad faith.") and Colorado
Forge Corp., 260 NLRB 35, 36-37 (1982) ("[I]t is well settled that the Board does not pass
on the reasonableness of the employees' complaints" underlying their concerted refusal to
work); Tamara Foods, Inc., 258 NLRB 1307, 1308 (1981), enforced, 692 F.2d 1171 (1982)
("Inquiry into the objective reasonableness of employees' concerted activity is neither necessary nor proper in determining whether that activity is protected."). In Washington Cartage,
Inc., 258 NLRB 701 (1981), the Board dismissed an unfair labor practice charge where a
truck driver had been discharged for refusing to drive a truck he considered unsafe, even
though the driver genuinely believed the truck was unsafe. The Board found that the employee's fears were due in part to his inexperience. Id. at 704. Consequently, it would appear
that the Board may not recognize protection for protesting employees whose fears are based on
personal ignorance or phobias.
128. In Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 NLRB 493, 496 (1984), the Board overruled Alleluia
Cushion Co., 221 NLRB 999 (1975), which had held that actions of a single employee are
concerted, protected activities under the Act if the issue involved is of interest to all employees.
However, the Board declined to similarly overrule or set forth the parameters of its decision in
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 NLRB 1295 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967),
where the Board had held that actions of an individual employee in attempting to enforce a
provision of an existing collective bargaining agreement are grievances within the framework
of the contract and thus are concerted activity protected by § 7 of the Act. The Board's Interboro doctrine was recently upheld by the Supreme Court. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc.,
465 U.S. 822 (1984). See also American and Efird Mills, 269 NLRB 1077 (1984). In this
case, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) commented:
Where there is no collective-bargaining agreement the merit of a single employee's
complaint on a safety matter must be corroborated by at least some objective criteria establishing a basis for a reasonable belief of the existence of a dangerous condition so as to make it a likely concern to more than just the complaining employee.
Id. at 1080-81. However, the Board's decision affirming the dismissal of the unfair labor practice charge expressly did not rely upon this portion of the ALJ's decision. Id. at 1077.
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activities 129 and, despite its plain language seeming to implicate individual employee actions, section 502 of the Act 30 has not yet been
construed to apply to situations other than those in which a union
calls for a health or safety inspired strike in a case where the union
has previously waived the right to strike through agreement to grievance arbitration.131 Regulations promulgated by the Department of
Labor to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act,"a2 however, seem to afford individual employees protection if they are confronted by a hazardous condition which might subject them to serious injury or death, as long as their work refusal is reasonable and
taken in good faith." 3
Where does this leave the employer faced by an individual or
concerted work refusal by employees who fear the presence of a per-.
son with AIDS in the workplace? If an employer has taken adequate
steps to educate his workforce about AIDS, and particularly about
the virtually conclusive evidence about transmissibility, subsequent
work refusals should not be found to be in good faith. Thus, the
employer could threaten or carry out discipline or discharge as a
means of ending the work refusal.13 4 Assuming, however, that an administrative or judicial adjudicator finds that such work refusals are
taken in good faith, would they be considered "reasonable" in such
circumstances, and is there an "objective basis" for the employees'
35
fears?1
Certainly, if there were significant doubts as to how HIV is
129.
130.
131.

29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1982). See supra notes 126, 128.
29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982).
See Beker Indus. Corp., 268 NLRB 975, 977-78 (1984) (Board reserves question

whether § 502 modifies § 7 to the extent of protecting individual employee in safety-related
work refusal).
132. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1985).
133. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980). As characterized by the Court in
Whirlpool, the pertinent regulation protects "the right of an employee to choose not to perform his assigned task because of a reasonable apprehension of death or serious injury coupled
with a reasonable belief that no less drastic alternative is available." Id. at 3-4.
134.

This is implied by the court in NLRB v. Modern Carpet Indus., Inc., 611 F.2d 811,

814-15 (10th Cir. 1979):
There is every reason to believe that they were in good faith. There was no reason to
suspect that they were not. The company did not act with intelligence in the matter.
If indeed the lead was harmless, management could at least have told the employees

who had made the appraisal or, better still, could have made a statement in writing
assuming liability for any harm that might be sustained. The employees offered .to
work with it after the lead was tested.
135. In at least one case, an arbitrator has ordered reinstatement of an employee who
refused to work due to AIDS fears, relying principally on management's clumsy response to

the situation. Minn. Dep't of Corrections, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1785 (Gallagher, Arb., 1985).
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transmitted, or that HIV infection is necessary for the development
of AIDS, employee fears might be "reasonable" or "objectively
based," for there is no denying at this stage in its history that CDCdefined AIDS is usually a terminal condition and seems to be
spreading at epidemic rates. 138 The repeated statements by public
health authorities and leading medical researchers that HIV is not
transmitted by casual workplace contact, and the increasing publication of such medical assurances in electronic and print media, makes
a refusal to work with a person with AIDS seem unreasonable. Fellow employees' disbelief of these reassurances should not form the
basis for authorizing discrimination against the person with AIDS.
Regardless whether the employee beliefs are reasonable, it is
questionable whether concerted activity would be protected where it
is engaged in for the purpose of compelling the employer to discriminate unlawfully against another employee. Indeed, there is some case
law indicating that a union may be committing an unfair labor practice under sections 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(2) if it seeks to pressure the
1 37
employer to discriminate in a manner violative of civil rights laws.
Surely, concerted activity for such a purpose could not be considered
protected, and such union or employee pressure would not be a valid
defense to a discrimination action against the employer by the person with AIDS.13 8
136. The current rate of new cases may not, however, be an accurate indication of current rate of new infection, because of the considerable "incubation" period associated with
HIV infection and substantial behavior modification by some of the affected risk groups.
Eckholm, Onset of AIDS After Transfusion Found to Lag Average of Five Years, N.Y.
Times, May 29, 1986, at A21, col. 1-2.
137. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Painters Local 1066, 205 NLRB 651 (1973); Amal-

gamated Local 453, 149 NLRB 482 (1964). The union might also be violating its statutory
duty to provide fair and unbiased representation to the employee with AIDS. As judicially and

administratively developed, the duty of fair representation would require the union to act in
good faith, and to avoid action which could be seen as "invidious treatment" against particular
employees. For a current summary of the law as to the union's duty of fair representation, see,
2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1285-1358 (C. Morris 2d. ed. 1983). However, an employer
faced with these problems in a union-represented workplace would be wise to involve the union

in any attempted resolution of the problem, if only to avoid the sort of "no-win" situation
described in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983), where an employer was
caught between the requirements of a collective agreement and a court-approved Title VII
settlement.

138.

Direct case law on this point is scant, but an analogy can be drawn from cases

arising under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982),
which held that mere concerted employee refusals to comply with a safety rule mandated by
OSHA, while perhaps protected under the National Labor Relations Act, without more, did
not excuse the employer from OSHA compliance. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.

OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1976); I.T.O. Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 543 (Ist Cir.
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While an employer may be able to threaten or carry out disci-

pline or discharge, it is undoubtedly better labor relations practice to
attempt to prevent the problem by employee education and, if that

fails, by transfer or replacement of the protesting employee. If a
union is present, it would also be prudent to involve the union in
discussions of ways to accommodate employees with AIDS.139 Disciplinary action or discharge of fellow employees who refuse to work
with the employee with AIDS should be a last resort. Such an approach is especially appropriate in the emotional climate surrounding
AIDS, where an inability to understand the sophisticated medical
knowledge underlying the assurances of safety can arouse fears that
are genuine, although unjustified.
IV.

TESTING AND RELATED

ISSUES

One of the most vexing legal issues arising from the AIDS crisis

is whether blood tests to detect HIV infection can have an appropriate role in employment. 140 Given the current state of medical knowledge, and the conclusions of public health officials that such testing
on a routine basis is unnecessary to protect the general workforce or
the public from the risk of infection,14 ' it might seem that such testing has no lawful purpose, 42 except in a limited range of workplaces
1976).
139. Since employee health and safety issues are mandatory subjects for bargaining, an
employer is obligated under the National Labor Relations Act to deal with the union on workplace matters involving health and safety. See Carbonex Coal Co., 248 NLRB 779, 800
(1980), aff'd, 679 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1982); J.P. Stevens & Co., 239 NLRB 738, 742-43
(1978), modified on other grounds, 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077
(1981). However, the obligation to bargain does not require agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1982).
140. The current blood testing for antibodies may become outmoded as medical research
leads to more direct medical tests for the presence of the suspected virus, in a form which
could be made as readily available as the current, relatively inexpensive ELISA antibody test.
141. Recommendations, supra note 25, at 686, 691, 693-94.
142. Testing might be seen as a marker for homosexuality in male employees, or intravenous drug use in employees of both sexes. The military, which maintains regulations against
enrollment of homosexuals in its ranks, has processed personnel with AIDS for discharge on
grounds of homosexuality. See Friedman & Stamey, Military, in AIDS LEGAL GUIDE: A PROFESSIONAL RESOURCE ON AIDS-RELATED LEGAL ISSUES AND DISCRIMINATION 50-56 (Lambda
Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. 1984, rev. ed. to be published 1987). Employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not prohibited by federal law, and the
Rehabilitation Act would only protect the intravenous drug user whose drug use does not present competency or safety issues. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). State law protection against
employment discrimination for homosexuals and/or drug users is spotty. However, employers
should be aware that one state (Wisconsin), the District of Columbia, and many counties and
municipalities (including some large cities with significant numbers of reported AIDS cases)
have adopted ordinances prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See E.
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where seropositivity might appear relevant to job function.1,43 Yet
there is an almost irresistible urge to use a test when it exists, especially if there is a perception that the test can be used to predict

difficulties before they occur. There is evidence that some employers
have seized upon the availability of this test as a way of removing
the AIDS problem from their workplaces. 4
The law on -medical testing and screening of employees is new

and largely undeveloped. 145 What little case law exists has more to
BOGGAN. M. HAFT, C. LISTER, J. Rupp, & T. STODDARD, THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE 16-17
(1983); NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD ANTI-SEXISM COMMITTEE OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA

§ 5.03[2] (1985). In jurisdictions which prohibit disability-based discrimination against "perceived disabilities," it could be argued that
homosexuals and drug users singled out for discharge due to perceptions of AIDS risk would
be protected. See supra notes 55, 56 and accompanying text.
143. With respect to the private sector, it might at first seem difficult to suggest such a
workplace without describing jobs far from the mainstream, such as employment as an actor in
pornographic productions involving performance of sexual acts, or as a sex therapy surrogate.
However, it has been suggested that certain job functions in health care might present circumstances where seropositivity would be a disqualifying factor. See Recommendations, supra
note 25, at 682, 691 (CDC still developing workplace recommendations for health care workers who perform "invasive procedures," such as surgeons and dentists, and for specialized settings such as prisons or institutions housing persons "who may exhibit uncontrollable behavior"). In the public sector, the military has taken the position that the necessity that active
duty soldiers be available as a source for emergency blood transfusions provides a justification
for excluding seropositive individuals. Although this looks like using a worst-case scenario to
justify the military's traditional exclusion of homosexuals, the military also advances an economic justification based on the medical costs associated with the complications of HIV infection. Bayer & Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 31. This justification would not be available to a
private employer subject to disability discrimination laws, however.
144. See N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, supra note 8, at 4-8. Of course, the predicate for using a test as a predictive device is that the test is an accurate predictor, and here the
antibody test is seriously lacking, since current evidence indicates that seropositivity alone is
not highly predictive of development of ARC or AIDS over a period of several years. Estimates of the number currently infected in the United States (and thus seropositive) range
from 300,000 to one million, but the number of cases presently counted by the CDC as of
August 1986 numbers about 23,000. See Levine & Bayer, Screening Blood: Public Health
CHAPTER, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW

and Medical Uncertainty in AIDS, in AIDS:

THE EMERGING ETHICAL DILEMMAS, HASTINGS

REP., Aug. 1985, at 8-11 (special supplement); Pear, U.S. Files, supra note 21, at 1,
col. 3; Mass, supra note 25, at 35. The use of medical tests to detect employees who may be at
"high risk" for developing occupational diseases is, of course, already practiced in some areas
of employment, and has received significant scholarly attention. See M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL
SCREENING OF WORKERS 23-51 (1984); Rothstein, supra note 82, at 1421-96. Although the
AIDS situation does not deal with an occupational illness, as such, many of the concerns to be
discussed are similar.
145. Report of the Committee on Development of the Laws of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities in the Work Place, 1982 A.B.A. LAB. AND EMPL. L. COMM. REP. 11 [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. REPORT] (concluding that statutory restrictions as to physical testing of
private sector employees have been virtually nonexistent, although suggesting possible applicability of tort concepts). See generally, Rothstein, supra note 82, at 1421-96 (discussing the
interrelationship between relatively new medical screening procedures and existing labor laws
CENTER
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do with testing for the use of controlled substances or alcohol, or
susceptibility to occupational illness, than for the presence of infectious agents.' 46 Objections to such testing (apart from potentially illegal use of the results of the test) 14 7 could be based on the perceived
invasion of individual privacy when a test requiring drawing blood is
involved,'148 as well as the degree to which such tests reveal intimate

details of the person's lifestyle and private habits which are believed
to be outside the scope of legitimate employer interest.1 4 9

and the need for new legislation).
146. See, e.g., Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985); Barnes
& White, Employee Privacy Rights: "Everything You Always Wanted to Know-But
Shouldn't," 64 MIcH. B.J. 1104, 1108 (1985). Testing might be considered unlawful under
laws forbidding sex or race discrimination if it had a disparate impact on particular racial or
sexual groups, under the theory of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), unless, of
course, the disparate impact was irrelevant because the test was job-validated. The burden
would be on the user of the test to demonstrate validation. Id. at 431-32. See also Rothstein,
supra note 82, at 1452-57 (concluding that in the case of medical screening of employees
through testing for susceptibility to occupational illness, in order to overcome the presumption
of discriminatory intent raised by the disparate impact, courts would probably require the
employer to demonstrate that: (I) valid reasons exist for excluding presently capable employees on the basis of the probability that they will become impaired in the future; (2) it is
essential to the business that employees be free from occupational illness; (3) a high correlation exists between the trait revealed by the testing and increased susceptibility to disease; (4)
the test used is an accurate predictor; and (5) no other test is available that will accomplish
the employer's purpose with less of a disparate impact). There are no reported validation studies with respect to the antibody test for HIV and job duties or qualifications. Furthermore, if
an employee refused to take a test which would have a disparate impact forbidden by Title
VII, the law might forbid disciplinary action against the employee based on such a refusal. See
Id. at 1466-67. The notion of any sort of medical screening, including genetic screening, as a
tool for excluding employees who might develop disabling conditions in the future, regardless
whether such conditions are work derived, has received considerable discussion, some critical.
See, e.g., Barnes & White, supra, at 1108; Diamond, Genetic Testing in Employment Situations: A Question of Worker Rights, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 231 (1983); Rothstein, supra note 82,
at 1409-96. Note, Employment Discrimination Implications of Genetic Screening in the
Workplace Under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 323 (1984);
Hunt, supra note 54, at 52, 55-57, 59-61.
147. Many state fair employment laws have generated regulations intended to define
what are appropriate uses of physical tests. See, e.g., Disability, 3 EMPL PRAC. GUIDE (CCH)
1 26,059 (N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights Nov. 1979) (rulings regarding pre-employment
inquiries); Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n R. 4112-5-08(F), 3 EMPL PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1
26,678.08 (Dec. 12, 1979); TEX.HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.010 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Most

significant in this connection are restrictions against disability-based discrimination with respect to regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act. See Note, supra note 146, at
336-46; infra note 163 and accompanying text.
148. Cf. Comment, Analyzing the Reasonableness of Bodily Intrusions, 68 MARQ. L.
REV. 130 (1984) (discussing the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures as protection of the individual's right to privacy in cases where the authorities seek to extract evidence from the body of a criminal suspect or defendant).
149. The notion that a concept of employee privacy limits the employer's right to personal information about employees is at an early stage of development, and has arisen in a

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss1/3

34

Leonard: AIDS and Employment Law Revisited
19851

EMPLOYMENT LAW REVISITED

Evaluating the validity of these objections in a legal context is
difficult because, apart from theoretical constitutional restraints
upon public employers' 5 ° and some scattered state constitutional and
statutory privacy provisions,' 5 ' there is little statutory basis for personal privacy rights of private sector employees.1 52 Much employee
privacy law is derivative in the sense that it may be a byproduct of
statutes intended to do other things, such as prevent discrimination

or abuse of data bases.1 53 Thus, employers are not supposed to make
certain inquiries of job applicants which are not job-related and
could create the potential for unlawful discrimination in hiring. ' A
general, comprehensive, statutory law of private sector employee priT

vacy does not yet exist, however, although the AIDS phenomenon

demonstrates why development of such a body of law would be appropriate. This lack of statutory guidance has led some jurisdictions
variety of contexts, including use of electronic monitoring of employee performance, use of the
polygraph, and protection of the confidentiality of personnel and medical records of employees.
See Castagnera-Cain, Defamation and Invasion of Privacy Actions in Typical Employee Relations Situations, 13 LINCOLN L. REV. 1 (1982); Diamond, supra note 146, at 245-47; Duffy,
Privacy vs. Disclosure: Balancing Employee and Employer Rights, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J.
594 (1982); Rothstein, supra note 82, at 1469-75; Stack, Polygraphs and Privacy-Statutory
Intervention is Needed to Protect Private Workers' Rights, FLA. B.J., 19 (1985); Note, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: The Need for Standards, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 438
(1984); Hunt, supra note 54, at 60-61. See generally INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION 177-278 (A. Westin & S. Salisbury eds. 1980) (identifying several management and
statutory approaches to employee privacy) and Belair, Employee Rights to Privacy, PROC.
N.Y.U. THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL NAT'L CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3 (1981) (discussing the developing notion of private sector employee privacy). In Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs.,
Inc., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983), the court, applying the Restatement (Second's) definition of
the tort of invasion of privacy to a sexual harassment complaint against an employer, allowed
a female employee to recover damages for medical problems resulting from the harassment.
150. The notion of public employee privacy rights is new and developing. See Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1738-1800 (1984); Note,
The Privacy Plight of Public Employees, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 189 (1984).
151. For a summary of state constitutional and statutory provisions providing some protection for private sector employee privacy rights, see Duff & Johnson, A Renewed Employee
Right to Privacy, 34 LAB. L.J. 747 (1983); Menard & Morrill, The Employer and the Law of
Privacy in the Workplace-The U.S. Model to Date, 9 N.CJ. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 93
(1983).
152. Rothstein comments, in connection with medical tests for susceptibility to occupational illness, that "private sector employees have few, if any, rights in this area." Rothstein,
supra note 82, at 1470.
153. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 145, at 3-7; Duff & Johnson, supra note 151, at 75154; Menard & Morrill, supra note 151, at 93-94.
154. See, e.g., Uniform Guidelines on EEOC Employee Selection Procedure, codified at
29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-1607.18 (1985); Pre-Employment Inquiries, 3 EMPL PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH)
26,050-26,062 (N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights Nov. 1979); Pre-Employment
Inquiry Guide, 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 26,650 (July 1984) (Ohio Fair Employment

Practices Law).
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to experiment with AIDS-specific legislative protection. To date,
Florida, 155 Wisconsin, 56 California,157 and Massachusetts' 18 have
adopted legislation or regulations which would restrict the use of antibody tests for HIV for workplace decisionmaking.
If a nonstatutory right of private sector employee privacy is to
be found in jurisdictions lacking such statutes, it might be derived
from the common law of torts. One might imagine a privacy action
premised on the theory that requiring an intrusive medical procedure
whose results may not lawfully be used is an unjustified invasion of
the body, a kind of physical assault, and certainly an insult to the
physical integrity of the employee.15 9 Furthermore, if the employee
tests seropositive and the employer fails to keep the information confidential, one can imagine the potential for defamation and related
tort developments.160
155. Fla. Stat. § 381.606, 3 EMPL PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 21,880 (May 30, 1985).
156. Wis. Stat. § 103.15, 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 29,130 (July 20, 1985) (providing that employees and job applicants may not be required to take an AIDS screening test
as a condition of employment).
157. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ch. 1.11-1.12 (West Supp. 1986). Also, the San
Francisco AIDS Discrimination Ordinance specifically bars use of the antibody blood test for
employment decisions. The ordinance forbids employers from requiring this test as a condition
of employment, unless the employer can show that it relates to a bona fide occupational qualification. San Francisco Ordinance No. 49985, 3 EmPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) I 20,950B.09
(Dec. 20, 1985) (to be codified at SAN FRANCISCO. CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II, ch. VIII,
art. 38, § 3809 (1986)).
158. Mass. L. 1986, ch. 241, adopted July 15, 1986 and not officially published at time
of writing, provides: "No employer shall require HTLV-II antibody or antigen tests as a
condition for employment." (3 EmPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 24,155 (July 15, 1986)).
159. Such an approach could be premised on an expansive interpretation of § 652(B),
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognizes a tort for intrusion upon the seclusion of an
individual. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1977). Without resorting to the Restatement, but using essentially the same concept, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently found a potential violation of private sector employee privacy rights in a discharge for refusal to undergo a polygraph examination. Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp.,
325 S.E,2d Ill (W. Va. 1984). Without expressly exploring the issue, and noting that courts
in some other jurisdictions had reached a contrary result, the court proclaimed that it would
violate public policy protecting the personal integrity of individual privacy to allow an employer to discharge an employee for refusing to take such a test. id. at 117. A West Virginia
statute forbidding such tests, which became effective after the incident involved in the case,
was seen by the court as merely codifying existing public policy. Id. The Restatement policy
was expressly invoked by the Alabama Supreme Court in Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance
Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983), finding privacy tort protection for a female employee
who alleged that she was sexually harassed by a supervisor. Prior to these recent developments,
courts (and some labor arbitrators) had been generally reluctant to recognize privacy rights in
these types of cases. See Rothstein, supra note 82, at 1469-71.
160. Some existing statutory authority exists regarding confidentiality of employee
records, particularly medical records. See A.BA. REPORT, supra note 145, at 6-7; Report of
the Privacy Protection Study Commission, Privacy Law in the United States, Appendix I
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While employers in many states may be able to compel job applicants or current employees to undergo medical tests, handicap and
disability discrimination law may significantly impede the ability of
employers to use the results of those tests. If an employee tests positively for antibodies to HIV (or, assuming a direct test for the virus
becomes generally available, tests positively for infection), what is

the employer to do with that information? In a jurisdiction which
would regard seropositivity as a "perceived disability," any action
taken to remove the employee from the workplace or to sever the
employment relationship would be unlawful, unless the employer
could prove that a negative antibody test was a bona fide occupa-

tional qualification.161 It would also seem clear that an employee terminated on the basis of seropositivity would be entitled to unemployment benefits, since the discharge could hardly be considered as
being "for cause" under current doctrines of unemployment compen16 2
sation law.
Furthermore, regulations promulgated under federal and state

handicap discrimination laws may affect the timing and use of medical tests. For example, Rehabilitation Act regulations forbid prehire
medical testing which is not justified as job-related and nondiscrimi(1977), at 17-27. In addition, some courts have recognized a tort action for negligent disclosure of inaccurate information about employees. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 145, at 7-8. Some
state constitutions also may provide privacy protections. Id. at 8. See Castagnera-Cain, supra
note 149; Duffy, supra note 149, at 598-60; Note, Privacy Rights in Medical Records, 13
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165-89 (1985). In Massachusetts, an employee is suing a large private
sector employer on a privacy tort theory for revealing confidential information about the employee's AIDS-related condition to coworkers. Cronan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., No.
80332 (Suffolk County Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1986) (order denying motion to dismiss privacy
and discrimination complaint).
161. Noninfection as a bona fide occupational qualification presents complicated employment discrimination law issues, particularly if it results in disparate impact against members of groups who are otherwise protected. A policy against employing persons with AIDS
would, in most parts of the United States, have a disparate impact on the basis of gender, race
or color, and perhaps national origin, thus potentially violating Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). Thus, such a policy would require validation,
documenting the job-relatedness of noninfection as a requirement. See supra note 146; Rothstein, supra note 82, at 1452-60.
162. See, e.g., Mack v. Ross, 54 A.D.2d 522, 386 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1976) (employee who
terminated her employment because she was disabled from performing the lifting her job required found not to have voluntarily quit). See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 1308 (1950)
(discussing the effect of disability on the right to unemployment compensation). A related
issue, dismissal of an employee who seeks leave time to care for a relative or friend with AIDS,
was recently decided in California favorably to the benefit rights of the dismissed employee.
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bd., Case No. SF-24774 (Sept. 13, 1985) (Robert P. Mason, ALJ) (The claimant's name was redacted from the slip opinion to preserve
confidentiality.).
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natory. The results of any such test may only be used in a manner
consistent with the statute, which bans employment discrimination
based on "a record" of a disability or a condition perceived as a
if the individual is "otherwise qualified" to perform the
disability
3
work.

16

The Cooper memorandum issued by the Justice Department in
June 1986 contends that seropositivity is not a handicap and that
discrimination against seropositive people is not forbidden by the Rehabilitation Act (particularly if motivated by fear of contagion, however irrational). 6 If this interpretation were adopted by the courts,
serological testing of employees for the purpose of detecting (and
discharging) those who test positive would presumably not violate
the federal law. However, this conclusion is inconsistent with existing
and should be rejected by
regulations and the policy of the statute,
165
the courts for reasons previously stated.
The central issue arising from employee testing concerns the extent to which employers need information about their employees
which may not relate to present ability to perform their work,166 and
the degree to which knowledge about HIV infection bears upon such
information. At present, the significance of a seropositive test result
is relatively uncertain, not because the tests are inaccurate, but because the comparatively short history of AIDS as a recognized disease deprives medical investigators of the opportunity to generalize
about long-term consequences of a seropositive result. The employer
has access only to existing knowledge, which indicates that a relatively small percentage of seropositive individuals will actually develop "terminal" AIDS over a period of five years from the date of
infection.1 67 Significantly less than half of a seropositive group will
develop any physical symptoms of infection in that time. 68 To penalize the majority of seropositive individuals who will not become ill in
the foreseeable future does not seem justified, given the lack of risk
163. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.13, 84.14(c) (1985).
164. Cooper, supra note 21, at D-9 to D-10.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 83-107.
166. See generally INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION, supra note 149, at 19399 (discussing the use of consumer reporting agencies by employers to investigate the background and lifestyles of prospective employees, and the protection afforded employees by the

Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1982)).
167. Indeed, describing CDC-defined AIDS as always "terminal" may be misleading,
since 15% of those diagnosed with CDC-defined AIDS in 1981 are still alive at the time of
writing in 1986. See Lieberson, supra note 1, at 43-44.
168.

Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss1/3

38

Leonard: AIDS and Employment Law Revisited
1985]

EMPLOYMENT LAW REVISITED

of contagion in the workplace and the serious social and personal
costs of employee discharges." 9
Closely related to the issue of testing is the issue of confidential-

ity. Assuming that there is a legitimate reason for the employer to
be aware of an employee's seropositive status or ARC or AIDS diagnosis, are there legitimate reasons to inform fellow employees? Due
to the minimal risk of HIV transmission during ordinary workplace
contact, it may seem that fellow employees have no legitimate inter-

'est in knowing. Workplace accidents involving exposure to blood
from a seropositive person might provide a justification for letting
fellow employees know, if special precautions must be taken in such
situations. However, studies among hospital workers who have been
exposed to bleeding incidents with AIDS patients do not appear to

justify special precautions.170
Does an employee have a protected privacy interest in this infor-

mation about him or herself? Once again, the common law of torts
may suggest answers. One court has opined that due to the social

stigma presently attached to seropositivity, individuals may have a
protected privacy interest in such information, at least as against a
litigating party seeking disclosure through judicial process.' The
same view might create liability where an employer or his agents
reveal this sort of information about an employee.17 2 Certainly, while
such forms of liability are uncertain but possible, respect for employee confidentiality in this regard would seem legally prudent. Fur169. The question of balancing employee and employer rights in the use of medical tests
to "screen" the workforce involves significant questions of social policy, which are complicated
in the case of AIDS by the identities of some of the larger risk groups. For some discussion of
the policy implications of medical testing to screen workers, see Rothstein, supra note 82, at
1491-96.
170. Recommendations, supra note 25, at 684.
171. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (privacy rights of blood donors outweigh evidentiary need of litigant seeking to
prove AIDS was contracted through blood donation). This case is pending on appeal before the
Florida Supreme Court.
172. A tort action in Massachusetts has been filed against the telephone company in a
case where a supervisor allegedly violated a promise to an employee to keep his AIDS-related
medical condition confidential. Cronan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 80332 (Suffolk
County Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1986). A major source of such problems could be company medical departments, using an antibody test and taking inadequate precautions to safeguard confidentiality of their results, or a personnel department, providing inadequate confidentiality to
information contained in medical benefit claims forms. Much of the existing developed private
sector privacy law has to do with protecting the confidentiality of personnel and medical
records of employees. See Duff & Johnson, supra note 151, at 753-62; Menard & Morrill,
supra note 151, at 97-104.
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thermore, preserving the confidentiality of such information would
diminish the likelihood of the kind of fellow worker reactions previ17 3
ously discussed.
V.

CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of AIDS poses significant questions about the
rights and responsibilities of employees and employers. To what extent should our society require employers to carry some of the burden of dealing with a new and mysterious illness which, when it occurs in their workplace, may create a serious potential for disruption
and economic loss, even though it presents no real risk of medical
harm to the employer, other employees, or customers of the business? To what extent should employers be required to shoulder the
economic burdens associated with treating the illness and supporting
those afflicted, in a society which lacks a national health insurance
system, leaving the unemployed or indigent dependent on a public
welfare system which is only a partial safety net that falls short in
many relevant ways? Preliminary answers to some of these questions
may be suggested by existing employment laws such as the Rehabilitation Act, ERISA, and Title VII. The application of these laws to
the AIDS situation may be viewed as fortuitous, however, since it is
likely that something like the AIDS phenomenon was not contemplated by the legislators who enacted them. In a few California cities, the initial response of local legislators contemplating the AIDS
phenomenon has been to balance rights and responsibilities in favor
of protecting persons with AIDS against discrimination, which may
be seen as confirming the same balance in construing the other laws
discussed in this Article. That legislative proposals striking the balance against the person with AIDS have thus far been unsuccessful
may indicate that our society would prefer to deal with the legal
fallout from this medical crisis in a positive manner.
However, translating the balance struck by the laws into reality
may require significant courage and maturity on the part of employers, many of whom will be placed in positions where they may be
sorely tempted deliberately to disobey legal nondiscrimination requirements, knowing that the progressively terminal nature of AIDS,
in many cases, will reduce the personnel and business problem into a
money problem174 which can be settled without an adverse impact on
173.
174.

See supra text accompanying note 128 to text following note 139.
This is, of course, only true to the extent that CDC-defined AIDS is invariably

disabling to a degree that disqualifies employees from working, which may not always be the
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their overall operations. Such an approach would add misery for
those already medically afflicted, and would divert scarce societal resources from treatment and prevention of the illness to fighting unlawful discrimination. It would also increase the strain on existing
social welfare systems, which would have to assume the burden of
providing housing, sustenance and treatment to the disease sufferers
whose income and benefit sources would have been cut off.
The AIDS challenge to employers is to transcend what may be
an immediate instinctive response generated by personal or economic
fears and to recognize the legal obligations as social and business
obligations as well. Some companies have already demonstrated 17 5
that a compassionate approach to the issues raised by AIDS in the
workplace can benefit the employer as well as the workforce.

case. Of course, discrimination against persons who test positive or merely exhibit ARC symptoms that are not work-disqualifying may not always result in a money claim because significant numbers of people in both of those categories may never become actually disabled to a
disqualifying degree.
175. Skagen & Aberth, supra note 8, at 14-25.
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